Why did Hitler lose the war to Stalin? The war against Russia is the “correct” war Hitler lost the war with the USSR

A month later, Russia will celebrate Victory Day, and the rest of the world will celebrate the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation. The bloodiest war ended with the defeat of the Wehrmacht and the signing by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel of the Act of Germany's unconditional surrender in that terrible war. By the beginning of the German invasion of the USSR, their army was the best in Europe, and, perhaps, in the whole world. Why did the Third Reich lose that war?

Reassessment of one's own strengths

Many experts are sure that Hitler lost the Second World War due to great self-confidence and overestimation of the forces of Germany. The results of the French campaign were taken into account as the basis for calculating the number of supplies, weapons and troops in the plan of attack on the USSR. The Germans celebrated their success and were sure that subsequent military confrontations would also be successful: hitherto, the French army was considered the best land army. By 1939, the French Republic was the third country on the planet in terms of the number of aircraft and tanks, and the fourth in terms of the strength of its fleet. Two million soldiers - the total number of French troops before Hitler's attack.

The invasion of the USSR made certain adjustments to the course of further military operations of the Germans. Blitzkrieg turned out to be erroneous, its implementation turned out to be beyond the strength of Berlin. In the second half of 1941, the Barbarossa plan failed, which became a big minus in terms of the strategy of the National Socialist high command.

Transfer of the landing date to the UK

The first raid on the United Kingdom was made by the Germans on August 15, 1940. This day is considered the beginning of the Battle of Britain. The attack was unsuccessful for the Nazis: the Luftwaffe lost 75 aircraft, while the enemy lost almost half as many (34).
Subsequent flights also did not bring success, and on September 17 of the same year, the Fuhrer issues an order to postpone the plan to land on the islands of the Kingdom for another time. These plans never materialized. In the spring of 1941, a campaign began in the Balkans, and in the summer - in the USSR. A year later, the Germans completely abandon their attempt to capture the British. Historians suggest that this move was Hitler's biggest strategic failure during the war.

Difficulties with allies

Adolf Hitler received the rank of corporal in the First World War, he wanted to fight, but, probably realizing that the Germans themselves would not be able to overcome the whole world, he tried to enlist allies. Here the Fuhrer could not achieve complete success, and the Axis countries did not become a single invincible force. The satellites of Berlin had their own goals in the Second World War, different from the aspirations and intentions of the leader of Germany.
The Japanese did not want to fight the Soviets, but fought the Americans. Spain sent only one "blue" division to the Eastern Front, while Hungary and Romania could not reconcile with each other.
The only forces that could really help the Germans defeat the USSR are anti-Stalinist organizations and their military formations, both white émigrés and anti-Soviet former prisoners of war. Hundreds of thousands of Russian people, who were not satisfied with the regime that existed within the Soviet Union, sincerely believed that their homeland deserved a better government, and their people deserved life. Albeit with the Nazis, but with the most honest and inspired desire, they tried to fight against Bolshevism. At the same time, Hitler was afraid to create a unified Russian national army, probably assuming that at the end of the war it simply would not give him the right to own Russia.

"The Impossibility of Defeat"

German historians involved in the study and research of the causes of Germany's defeats in the war believe that there was a kind of "taboo" of the country's loss, which was present at all systemic levels of the state, as well as in the army. The anti-Hitler side made all decisions at general councils, and even the options for possible concessions and defeats were taken into account in their calculations and forecasts.
This was not the case in the Millennium Reich. All defeatist moods were destroyed at once. Experts believe that because of this, the Germans could not equip an established military-political system of warfare. Scholar Berndt Wegner writes: "It sounds unexpected, but most of the war Germany fought in an impromptu tone." Already at the end of the war, during the Berlin operation, Hitler still believed that the corps of Busse, Wenck and Steiner would approach the capital of their country and defeat the Red Army. But no one could save the rapidly collapsing Reich.

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- When was it decided in Germany to attack the USSR?

This decision was taken in the course of a successful campaign for Germany in France. In the summer of 1940, it became increasingly clear that a war against the Soviet Union would be planned. The fact is that by this time it became clear that Germany could not win the war with Great Britain with the available technical means.

That is, in the autumn of 1939, when the Second World War began, Germany had no plans to attack the USSR yet?

The idea may have been, but there were no specific plans. There were also doubts about such plans, which were later dropped, however.

What were these doubts?

Army Chief of Staff Franz Halder was not opposed to the war, but he disagreed with Hitler on one strategic issue. Hitler wanted to capture Leningrad for ideological reasons and Ukraine, where there were large industrial centers. Halder, given the limited capabilities of the German army, considered it important to take Moscow. This conflict remained unresolved.

Another issue is the supply of German troops with ammunition, ammunition, food. There were the loudest warnings about this. The German military attaché in Moscow warned that the USSR was a vast country with vast distances. But when the boss wants war, warnings about the dangers are undesirable. Recently, the Pentagon was not very willing to listen to people who doubted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

- Was Hitler really the main driving force of this war?

Yes. The German ambassador to the USSR hoped that relations would be good. However, the ambassador did not play a big role when it came to determining German policy.

The strategic supply of raw materials from the Soviet Union was very important for the German military campaign. In addition, the USSR allowed transit deliveries from Southeast Asia. For example, rubber for tire production. That is, there were important strategic reasons not to start a war against the Soviet Union, but the military, who fawned over Hitler and competed with each other, tried to outdo each other, offering plans to attack the USSR.

Why did Hitler want this war so much?

Firstly, these were ideological reasons, outlined in his book "Mein Kampf" - living space for the Germans and gaining access to raw materials. But from these considerations, the war could be started at any moment. Therefore, there must have been additional reasons, and the main one at that moment was the impossibility of winning the war with Great Britain.

How do you explain that the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin ignored Germany's preparations for war, because there were intelligence reports about this?

This passivity was based on the belief that Hitler would not be so stupid. Until the evening of June 22, 1941, Stalin thought that this was an operation of the German generals without the knowledge of Hitler, with the aim of setting him up. Only then were decisive orders given to the Red Army to crush and pursue the enemy everywhere. Up to this point, Stalin apparently refused to believe what really happened.

Hitler and the German generals were convinced that the war with Russia could be won in three months. These views were shared in the West, against the backdrop of the successes of the Germans in Europe, especially the quick victory over France.

Judging by secret documents, in particular intelligence reports, it seems that the USSR secret services knew about the impending German attack, but the army was not informed about this. Is it so?

Yes, at least there was no alarm in the army. Stalin was convinced that any provocation could force Hitler to attack the USSR. He thought that if he showed unpreparedness for war, Hitler would concentrate on the western front. This was a big mistake for which the Soviet Union had to pay a high price. As for the intelligence data, the reports on the timing of the attack were constantly changing. The Germans themselves were engaged in disinformation. However, all information about the upcoming attack came to Stalin. He knew everything.

This was due to the completion of the preparation of the Wehrmacht for this war. But in the end, he still wasn't ready. Technical superiority was a sham. The supply of German troops was carried out by half with the help of horse-drawn carts.

The beginning of summer was also chosen because then the danger of off-road increased every day. The Germans knew that, firstly, there are no good roads in Russia, and secondly, the rains in the off-season wash them away. By autumn, the Germans were actually stopped not by enemy forces, but by nature. Only with the advent of winter, the German troops were again able to continue the offensive.

Hitler explained the war with the USSR by the fact that he was allegedly ahead of Stalin. In Russia, you can also hear this version. What do you think?

There is still no confirmation of this. But no one knows what Stalin really wanted. It is known that Zhukov had a plan to launch a preemptive strike. It was handed over to Stalin in mid-May 1941. This happened after Stalin gave a speech to the graduates of the military academy and said that the Red Army is an offensive army. Zhukov saw a greater danger in the German military plans than Stalin did. He then headed the General Staff and used Stalin's speech as an excuse to develop a plan for a preemptive strike in order to prevent the German offensive in the east. As far as we know, Stalin rejected this plan.

- Could Germany have won the war against the USSR?

Considering that Stalin and his system did not want to give up, stopping at nothing, and the Soviet people were literally driven to this war, then Germany could not win it.

But there were two points. The first - at the beginning of the war, and the second - in October 1941, when the German troops were already exhausted, but they began an offensive against Moscow. The Russians had no reserves, and Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that the gates to Moscow stood wide open. The advance detachments of German tanks then reached the outskirts of today's Moscow. But they could not go further. Stalin was apparently ready to try again to negotiate with Hitler. According to Zhukov, he entered Stalin's office at the moment when he said goodbye to Beria with words about looking for the possibility of a separate peace with the Germans. The USSR was allegedly ready for big concessions to Germany. But nothing happened.

- What were Germany's plans for the occupied lands?

Hitler did not want to occupy the entire Soviet Union. The border was to run from the White Sea in the north along the Volga to the south of Russia. Germany did not have sufficient resources to occupy the entire USSR. It was planned to push the Red Army to the east and hold back with the help of air strikes. It was a big illusion. In the occupied territories, National Socialist ideas were to be put into practice. There was no exact plan. It was assumed that the Germans would rule, and the local population would do slave work. It was assumed that millions of people would die of starvation, this was part of the plan. At the same time, Russia was to become the breadbasket of Germany-occupied Europe.

When, in your opinion, did the turning point in the war come, after which it was no longer possible for Germany to win it?

Provided that the Soviet Union was not going to surrender, and it was, except for one moment in October, it was impossible in principle to win the war. I would even say that even without the help of the West to Moscow, Germany could not win this war. Moreover, Soviet tanks, both the T-34 and the Joseph Stalin heavy tank, were superior to the German models. It is known that already after the first tank battles in 1941, designer Ferdinand Porsche was sent to the front as part of a commission to study Soviet tanks. The Germans were very surprised. They were sure that their technique was much better. Germany could not win this war in any way. There was only the possibility of an agreement on certain conditions. But Hitler was Hitler, and at the end of the war he behaved more and more insanely, like Stalin at the beginning - that is, the order was given not to surrender anything to the enemy. But the price was too high. The Germans could not afford this, unlike the USSR at the beginning of the war. The Soviet Union lost millions of people, but the reserves remained, and the system continued to work.

Professor Bernd Bohn evening (Bernd Bonwetsch)- German historian, founder and first director of the German Historical Institute in Moscow, author of publications on German-Russian history

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

The defeat of the Third Reich in World War II was caused by many reasons, but we want to identify the main strategic mistakes made by Germany during the conflict.

Capacity reassessment

The main strategic mistake of the Third Reich was the overestimation of its own forces. The results of the victorious campaign in France were taken as the basis for calculating the number of weapons, supplies and manpower during an attack on the USSR. The German commanders were inspired by this victory - the army of France was considered the strongest land army. By the beginning of World War II, France was third in terms of the number of tanks and aircraft and fourth in terms of the power of the fleet. The total number of French troops numbered more than 2 million people.

But the war with the USSR turned out to be total, and the calculation of a lightning-fast blitzkrieg was erroneous. Implementing it proved to be a daunting task.

When the Barbarossa plan failed by the fall of 1941, it meant a strategic disaster for the Third Reich.

Transfer of landings to the British Isles

On August 15, 1940, the first German air raid on London was made. This day is considered the beginning of the Battle of Britain. In one day, the Luftwaffe lost more than twice as many vehicles as the enemy - 75 German aircraft against 34 British.

During subsequent raids, negative statistics persisted. As a result, on September 17, 1940, Hitler ordered the proposed Operation Sea Lion (landing on the British Isles) to be postponed indefinitely, on October 12, it was postponed to the winter. In the spring of 1941, the Balkan campaign of the Wehrmacht began, and in the summer Hitler attacked the USSR. In the spring of 1942, Hitler finally abandoned the Sea Lion.

He left London "for later", which, according to current experts, was the Fuhrer's main strategic mistake.

Inconsistent allies

Hitler wanted to fight and, as he himself believed, knew how, but he did not succeed in making friends, he did not manage to make a single force out of Germany and its allies. The Allies of the Third Reich had goals in World War II that were different from those of the Fuhrer.

Japan did not want to attack the USSR and fought with the USA. Spain gave to the Eastern Front, gave only one division, did not consider the USSR to be Mussolini's main enemy. There was contention between the allies themselves - Hungary and Romania considered each other opponents.

The alliance with the Third Reich was beneficial to the OSI countries only as long as the Germans were victorious. The diplomat from Hitler turned out to be weak.

Weak logistics

In the Third Reich during the war, supply problems constantly arose. This was caused by several factors. Firstly, German weapons were very diverse (French guns, Czech tanks), that is, they required a million unique spare parts.

The logistics of the Third Reich were weak due to personnel. Work in strategic supply was considered a duty - you will not achieve glory. Therefore, second-rate and third-rate officers turned out to be so. Ambitious and gifted officers, if they were engaged in supply, then operational.

The unresolved issue of supply on the Eastern Front manifested itself in full measure. In the German tank divisions, only a small 10th part of the equipment had caterpillar tracks. The rest of the cars were wheeled, that is, they were intended for roads.

But in the USSR they were not. The whole country in 1941 had less than a hundred thousand kilometers of paved roads. The cars got stuck in the mud and snow, the equipment even had to be left. The supply slowed down.

"Taboo Defeat"

The German historian Bernd Wegner from the University of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg, among the strategic factors that led to the defeat of Germany, calls the “tabooization of defeat”, which dominated at all systemic levels both the state in general and the army in particular. Both Churchill and Stalin made important decisions at the councils, even assumed in their calculations the options for defeat.

The Third Reich could not afford this in its calculations. Any defeatist sentiments were nipped in the bud. Because of this, because of a systematic error in miscalculations, Germany could not build a reliable military-political concept of war. The same Wegner wrote: "It sounds unexpected, but Germany fought most of the war in an improvisational mode."
Even during the Berlin offensive, Hitler continued to believe that the armies of Wenck, Busse, and the army group of F. Steiner were marching towards Berlin, which would defeat the Red Army. As we know from history, they did not break.

Current page: 1 (the book has 27 pages in total)

Why did Hitler lose the war? german look
(Second World War. Life and Death on the Eastern Front).

Foreword by Alexei Isaev

"Twilight state of mind", temporary or permanent clouding of the mind is one of the convenient and common explanations for the adoption of military and political decisions of non-obvious expediency. Often, journalists and historians, like the screenwriters of mediocre Hollywood films, offer their readers mental disorders as an explanation for certain moves with disastrous consequences. Memoirists even more often pat on the back, or even after the fact generously hand out cuffs to the leaders, before whom they trembled in their time at the helm of power. However, most often this is nothing more than an attempt to find a simple answer to a complex question and the desire to avoid a deep analysis of the situation. To the greatest extent, the passion for the personal decision-making factor affected the history of the Third Reich. In some places, the really eccentric behavior of Adolf Hitler, repeatedly reinforced by third-hand retellings, provided enormous opportunities for shifting the burden of responsibility from objective factors to subjective factors. At the same time, critics of the decisions of the “possessed Fuhrer” did not always take a critical enough approach to the issue of the feasibility of theoretically correct versions of orders and orders. All the more difficult is the understanding of the cause-and-effect relationships of events for foreigners, including the domestic reader.

The presented collection of articles fills this gap to some extent, covering the military and political aspects of the rise and fall of the Third Reich through the eyes of German specialists. It collects research on a wide range of topics, from weapons production to the strategic and political aspects of World War II.

The collection opens with an article by X. Hemberger on the German economy and industry on the eve and during the Second World War. The article describes the titanic work that was done in the 30s with the aim of turning the Third Reich into an autarchy capable of doing without the import of certain types of raw materials and food. Shortly after Hitler came to power, a plan was proposed and put into practice to replace several strategically important raw materials with synthetic counterparts. This primarily concerned rubber and hydrocarbon fuels. In the Third Reich, due to large-scale state investments in the chemical industry, the production of synthetic rubber and synthetic gasoline was launched. Hemberger traces the system of economic and political decisions of the German leadership, which made it possible to take a big step towards the creation of an autarchy capable of existing under blockade conditions.

At the same time, the image of Germany as a country experiencing a total shortage of all types of natural resources is being destroyed. Full provision of domestic needs with coal made it possible to spend large volumes of this fuel on the production of synthetic fuel. In addition, the situation has changed significantly since the First World War, not least due to the progress of the technical means of warfare. Unlike the USSR, Germany not only covered its needs for aluminum and magnesium, but even had the opportunity to export these materials, which were essential for the aviation industry. In contrast, in the Soviet Union, the scarcity of bauxite deposits led to the widespread use of wood as a material for the production of aircraft. In the 1930s and 1940s, aviation became one of the most important instruments of warfare. The natural resources of Germany created all the possibilities for the production of high-quality combat aircraft. Both the Heinkels that terrorized European cities, and the Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers that became the symbol of the blitzkrieg, and the Messerschmitts were built from “winged metal”.

All-metal aircraft had undoubted advantages over Soviet aircraft, in the design of which the base material was wood. For example, hitting a 20-mm airgun projectile into a metal wing did not lead to damage that threatened to destroy the entire structure. On the contrary, for the wooden wing of a domestic aircraft during the war, the same hit threatened much more serious consequences. The wooden wing turned out to be heavier than a metal wing comparable in strength, in wartime conditions it was difficult to withstand its geometry and quality of finish. All these factors played a role in the air war on the Eastern Front.

Moreover, German designers could afford the luxury of using aluminum alloys not only in aircraft construction, but even replacing steel with them in gun carriages (in particular, on the 150-mm heavy infantry gun "sIG-33") and producing from "winged metal » massive pontoons for the construction of floating bridges. All these facts were not given due attention in Russian historiography. The USSR was declared an inexhaustible pantry of natural resources, although this was generally not true. There were very few deposits of the main source of aluminum - bauxite - in the USSR, and the country experienced a severe shortage of aluminum, which was even supplied under lend-lease from the United States.

The view of German historians is also useful in terms of understanding the role of the Soviet Union as a subject of big European politics. A characteristic feature of the Soviet historical school was the exaggeration of the significance of the USSR for Germany as an object for a military operation. The “young Soviet state”, around which, like planets around the Sun since 1917, the world superpowers have been revolving, seeking to deal with it at all costs, is a highly distorted picture of world politics.

Another German historian, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, whose work is included in this collection, writes: “However, it was by no means the “living space in the East”, the forcible conquest of which already from the 1920s permeated Hitler’s political calculations, served as the main activating moment; no, the main impetus was the Napoleonic idea of ​​defeating England by defeating Russia.”

Such an approach to the problem of the emergence of the Barbarossa plan was not typical for domestic historians, who focused more on long-term plans for the conquest of "living space" and the capture of natural resources. However, Adolf Hitler himself formulated the reasons for the attack on the USSR in a speech at a secret meeting at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht on January 9, 1941, as follows: “The British are supported by the hope that the Russians might intervene. They will only give up resistance when this last continental hope of theirs is crushed. He, the Fuhrer, does not believe that the British are "hopelessly stupid"; if they do not see any prospect, they will stop fighting. If they lose, they will never find the moral strength to save the empire. If they can hold out, form 30-40 divisions, and if the United States and Russia provide them with assistance, then a very difficult situation will be created for Germany. This cannot be allowed.

Until now, he [Hitler] has acted on the principle of striking at the most important positions of the enemy in order to advance one step further. Therefore, now it is necessary to defeat Russia. Then either England will surrender, or Germany will continue to fight against England under the most favorable conditions. The defeat of Russia will also allow Japan to turn all its forces against the United States. And this would keep the latter from entering the war.

The question of time is especially important for the defeat of Russia. Although the Russian armed forces are a clay colossus without a head, it is impossible to accurately predict their further development. Since Russia must be defeated anyway, it is better to do so now, when the Russian army is leaderless and ill-prepared, and when the Russians have to overcome great difficulties in the military industry created with outside help.

Nevertheless, even now the Russians cannot be underestimated. Therefore, the German offensive must be carried out with maximum forces. Under no circumstances should the frontal pushing back of the Russians be allowed. Therefore, the most decisive breakthroughs are needed. The most important task is to quickly cut off the Baltic Sea area; for this it is necessary to create a particularly strong grouping on the right wing of the German troops, which will advance north of the Pripyat marshes. Although the distances in Russia are large, they are no more than the distances that the German armed forces have already coped with. The goal of the operation should be to destroy the Russian armed forces, to seize the most important economic centers and to destroy other industrial regions, primarily in the Yekaterinburg region, in addition, it is necessary to capture the Baku region.

The defeat of Russia will be a great relief for Germany. Then only 40-50 divisions would have to be left in the East, the size of the land army could be reduced, and the entire military industry could be used to arm the air and naval forces. Then it will be necessary to create a reliable anti-aircraft cover and move the most important industrial enterprises to safe areas. Then Germany will be invulnerable.

The gigantic expanses of Russia are fraught with incalculable riches. Germany must take possession of these areas economically and politically, but not annex them. Thus, she will have all the possibilities for waging a future struggle against the continents, then no one else will be able to defeat her. 1
Dashichev V.I. Bankruptcy strategy of German fascism. M.: Nauka, 1973. S. 93–94 with reference to KTV OKW, Bd.I. S. 253–258.

A balanced look at the roots of the Barbarossa plan gives dynamics to the attitude of the leadership of the Third Reich towards the USSR. Initially, the campaign against the Soviet Union was auxiliary to the main (as it seemed to Hitler) events of the war in Europe, which were to unfold at sea and in the air. The collapse of the Barbarossa made the ancillary campaign the main content of the Second World War for Germany, relegating the air and sea war with England to the background.

In addition to the most significant issues of relations between the USSR and Germany for the domestic reader, German historians pay much attention to the consequences of the air battle over the Reich. Before us is a picture of the destruction of large cities, generated by the imperfection of weapons of air warfare. Bombers of the Second World War, armed with free-fall bombs dropped from a height of several kilometers, could only effectively hit a target of the “large city” type. Contrary to Douai's theory, the impact on the major cities did not lead to the surrender of Germany. Air terror only embittered people in the rear and at the front. However, the German people had to pay dearly for testing the theory of the Italian military theorist in practice. Gerhard Schreiber writes: "As a result of the bombing, almost five million apartments were destroyed - a quarter of the total housing stock in 1939." At the same time, monuments of history and culture, created long before Hitler came to power, were destroyed.

On the contrary, industrial enterprises defended by strong air defense systems and represented relatively compact targets suffered much less. Schreiber gives the following estimates of the impact of Anglo-American aviation on German industry: “In general, the damage to the buildings and technical equipment of industrial enterprises caused by enemy air raids, ground battles and destruction by one’s own hands amounted to 10 to 15 percent of structures, if we take for the starting point of 1936 with its full workload.

Of course, the hopelessness of air terror was realized by the Anglo-American command, and in search of targets for a direct impact on the functioning of the German military machine, they turned their attention to communications. Schreiber writes: "After all, the Allies dropped seven times as many bombs on Germany's transport system - as well as on its civilian population, than on its military-industrial enterprises." It was the destruction of the transport network that prevented the rapid restoration of pre-war production volumes by German industry. At the same time, it should be noted (this moment was missed by Schreiber) that a massive impact on the transport network of the Third Reich began only in the autumn of 1944. Until September 1944, sporadic Allied bomber strikes were carried out on German railway and river communications, but they did not have any noticeable effect on transportation. Accordingly, the military industry of the Third Reich was able to reach peak performance. Bridges, railway junctions, and the infrastructure of the German river fleet were really hit hard only in September and October 1944. These strikes achieved their goals. On March 16, 1945, Speer reported to Hitler: "The German economy is in for an inevitable collapse within 4-8 weeks."

In addition to strategic economic issues, much attention is paid to big politics in the collection. Here, German historians also depart from the classic version of setting Germany against the USSR, on the one hand, and avoid sweeping accusations of suggestibility and weakness among major politicians. In particular, it is subjected to a thoughtful analysis of the politician Neville Chamberlain, the "father" of the Munich Agreement. Sebastian Haffner: “The basis of the “pacifying” calculations was Hitler's anti-Bolshevism and his openly proclaimed plans for conquest in the East. They, as Chamberlain expected, made it impossible for Germany and Russia to act together. And while both continental giants kept each other at bay, England, together with France, dragging along in the wake of her policy, could, as has long been customary, play a decisive role. In addition, the old cordon sanitaire still existed between Germany and Russia - the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, etc. This cordon could prevent or at least complicate a direct military clash between Germany and the Soviet Union. Thus, as we see, there was a desire of the British Prime Minister to create a system of "checks and balances" in Europe and avoid military action.

Explanations other than doubts about Hitler's mental capacity, Haffner also gives German policy towards the United States during 1940-1941: "The thirteen-month duel (from November 1940 to December 1941) between Roosevelt and Hitler looks funny, because Hitler acted in it in a completely unusual role: Roosevelt, full of rage, was opposed by the meek, almost like a lamb, Hitler. The German historian invites readers to look at the relationship between Roosevelt and Hitler from a different angle, and such a theory is quite worthy of the right to exist.

There is also a bridge in Haffner's work from politics to military operations. He explained the offensive of the German troops in the Ardennes from a political point of view: "Hitler wanted to put the Western powers before a choice: either at the last minute to come out with him against the Soviet Union, or stay with nothing." So big politics influenced strategy, proposing to attack in the West in the face of the threat of a strike in the East, which was to follow any day and really took place at the beginning of January 1945.

One can argue with the points of view expressed in the German View, but one thing is certain: they were expressed by people who understood well the realities of the country that was the enemy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

Hans Adolf Jacobsen
HOW THE SECOND WORLD WAR WAS LOST

At dawn on August 26, 1939, six days before the start of the war, the German Wehrmacht Special Forces suddenly captured the Yablunkovsky Pass in Poland. She had the task of keeping it open until the advance units of the ground forces approached; more than 2,000 Polish soldiers were captured at the same time. Hitler's order to postpone the offensive planned for August 26 could no longer reach this "detachment for operations in the dark" in time. He had to withdraw in small groups to the German border.

Only on August 31, 1939, Hitler gave the final order for the offensive: on September 1, at 4:45 am, the German divisions entered Poland. The Second World War broke out when England and France (including the dominions), fulfilling their allied obligations to Poland, declared war on Germany on September 3 after the expiration of their ultimatums. They did not stop even before the serious consequences of their step, as Hitler hoped to the very end, being in a state between illusion and self-deception. When the chief translator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs translated the fatal words of the note from the Western powers to him, he "as if frozen ... and sat in his chair completely silent and motionless." Hitler's idea of ​​the cowardly and accommodating position of England and France was not confirmed; his big trump card, the August 23 non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, did not play either: the allies were determined to put an end to Hitler's expansionist policy, which they had realized back in the spring. The time when they put up with the fait accompli is over. From the moment of the German occupation of the Czech Republic and Moravia, they, supported in that by the President of the United States, turned the steering wheel of their policy by 180 degrees: by entering Prague, Hitler "crossed the Rubicon."

In contrast to 1914, in relation to 1939, the problem of guilt for the war as such, in fact, does not stand, although its historical assessments could be more differentiated than is formulated in numerous post-war studies.

With regard to the outbreak of the First World War, West German and foreign researchers agree that we should talk about shared responsibility. All participants in this war, as Lloyd George once put it, were "drawn into" the conflict to a greater or lesser extent, and each of them, entering into it, sincerely believed that he had to defend himself, arms in hand, against attack from outside. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, which placed the blame for the war solely on Germany and its allies, placed a fatal burden on the shoulders of the young Weimar Republic. After the collapse of the European state system as a result of the First World War, the failed attempt to reorganize Europe in 1919 provided fertile ground for a further, fraught with grave consequences, course of development. The Treaty of Versailles, neither territorially nor politically, much less morally, could satisfy the European nations, especially the defeated ones; Nor was he capable of promoting the desired comprehensive understanding. The then-created League of Nations, despite some of its achievements, was unable to resolve disputes at the international level, since it had to make decisions only unanimously and, moreover, did not have sufficient executive power. But the United States of America, which emerged from the First World War as a power-political and especially ideological leading force, stood especially far away from the League of Nations, and then again fell into isolationism.

In this era, which was also characterized by economic depression and spiritual crises, the demagogues found obedient masses who enabled them to carry out their own political ideas with promises and promises. One thing is certain: in 1933, Hitler began his foreign policy with the struggle against the Versailles "dictatorship". Under the slogan of “peace”, he freed Germany step by step from the restrictions imposed on her and, in his own way, helped to restore the full effectiveness of the unilaterally formulated right of peoples to self-determination in 1919. But behind this nationalistically framed policy of revision of the Treaty of Versailles, which its propagandists portrayed in the most favorable light, something much more was hidden from the very beginning. Along with internal consolidation and the creation of a totalitarian Führer state, the formation of which Hitler accelerated by cruel means and methods, he purposefully pursued (at first only poorly realized as the realization of the ideas of his book Mein Kampf) two major goals: the conquest of the "corresponding population of the living space" in the East (while settling accounts with Bolshevism) and the establishment of his dominance in Europe, with which he intended to link its nationalist transformation in the spirit of his racial theory. However, he always left the decision on the time and direction of this or that action (acting “this way or that way”) to himself, not making it until the very last moment.

Driven by his inherent impatience and fear of not having time to carry out his historically unique “cause” before the end of his own life, Hitler in his policy did not take into account any rules of human and national coexistence. Since his actions, starting from 1935, did not encounter any significant resistance from the European powers, he acted more and more boldly: the restoration of universal conscription and the entry of troops into the remilitarized Rhineland, combined with forced armament - these were the first stages of his beginning prestigious success. Instead of putting it in its place from the outset, which was still possible with the military superiority of the Western powers in the early years of National Socialist domination, England and France (underestimating the methods and dynamics of the totalitarian National Socialist system) believed that they could more quickly contribute to the solution all contentious issues with a policy of appeasement. In 1936, Hitler brought about the rapprochement with Italy that he sought (the Berlin-Rome axis), and also strengthened Germany's position as a bulwark against Bolshevism by concluding the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. A year later, at a secret meeting on November 5, 1937, in the narrowest circle, he declared that for him in resolving the issue of German living space there is only one path of force, and without risk this path is unthinkable.

When, on February 4, 1938, Hitler removed from their posts the Imperial Minister of War, Field Marshal von Blomberg and the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Baron von Fritsch, and took command of the Wehrmacht directly, another important step was taken: the strongest tool of the state, hitherto unified only politically, has now lost its professional-military independence. Thus, in a future war, the role of commander was to fall to Hitler's lot! At the same time, diplomacy also came under his influence when he appointed Ribbentrop as Reich Foreign Minister instead of Baron von Neurath. After the Anschluss of Austria, when Hitler's authority among the people was further strengthened, he began to strive for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia. But first he had to content himself in Munich in September 1938 with a partial solution: Germany received the Sudetenland, which was occupied on October 1, 1938. Although Hitler on September 26 declared publicly in the Reichstag: "We do not need the Czechs", already in mid-December he gave the headquarters

The Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), albeit with some reservations, an order to take all preparatory measures to defeat the rest of the Czech Republic.

* * *

The entry into Prague marked the beginning of a decisive turn towards war: far from being satisfied with this booty, Hitler turned his gaze to Poland. Since 1935, he tried to win her over to his side for a joint struggle against the Soviet Union. But he had to abandon this plan at the end of 1938, since the leading figures of Poland did not even think of allowing themselves to be made an instrument of the National Socialist aggressive policy, hoping to pursue an independent policy as a "third force" in Europe. They also rejected Hitler's proposals for resolving the question of Danzig and the corridor of March 21, 1939, while the Western powers on March 31 gave their guarantees to Poland. Hitler denounced the German-English naval agreement and the German-Polish non-aggression pact (April 28) and at the same time entered into a military alliance with Italy (the "Steel Pact"), and also, in competition with the Western powers, stepped up diplomatic efforts against Moscow to get a free hand against Poland. This led on August 23, 1939 to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. After Hitler made the final decision to attack Poland in early August, German-Polish relations became more and more aggravated. The excesses of many Poles against the Volksdeutsche, deliberately exaggerated by the National Socialist press, gave Hitler a welcome pretext for a violent invasion. True, the conclusion of the Polish-British Mutual Assistance Pact of August 25 and Italy's declaration that it was not ready for war led once again to the postponement of the attack. But on August 31, 1939, Hitler ordered the entry of the Wehrmacht, after direct Polish-German negotiations did not take place and Poland, completely unaware of its actual military capabilities, announced mobilization on the afternoon of August 30.

The critically thinking politician of those dramatic August days of 1939 [the German ambassador in Rome] W. von Hassel described his impressions as follows: “... Hitler and Ribbentrop wanted war against Poland and deliberately risked war with the Western powers, until the last days temperature the illusion that they will remain neutral. The Poles, with their Polish arrogance and Slavic pliability to the course of events, imbued with confidence in England and France, missed any remaining chance to avoid war. The London government, whose ambassador did everything to keep the peace, in recent days stopped this race and made a kind of "Vogue la galiere" 2
Ibgue la galiere - the curve will take you out (fr.).

France followed this path with much greater hesitation. Mussolini spared no effort in order to avoid war ... ”It is characteristic that already in this first campaign, Hitler’s military goal went far beyond the defeat of the enemy armed forces: he wanted to fight until the complete annihilation of Poland!

Of course, the Second World War did not arise only as a result of the ambition and lust for power of an individual. But hardly any power was free from the blame for this second European catastrophe, for all the states that later participated in the war had previously rendered more or less strong assistance to the National Socialist policy. However, the fact remains that Hitler deliberately unleashed a war against Poland and thereby caused the Second World War. Therefore, he bears such responsibility for it, which is generally “conceivable within the framework of major global political processes” (Herzfeld).

The outbreak of World War II, which caused the German people not to delight, but to skepticism and gloomy forebodings, found the Wehrmacht in the midst of its construction. It was carried out at a very fast pace, almost in a hurry, and, moreover, in breadth, and therefore it lacked depth in the field of weapons and personnel. Thus, Germany possessed an instrument of war that was still far from being ready for action, even though she was ahead of the Western powers in the production of modern types of weapons. Of the required four-month supply of weapons of any kind, an average of 25% was available; ammunition for anti-aircraft artillery and aerial bombs was enough for only three months, while fuel supplies from reserves and current production, at best, covered the needs of only four war months. The General Staff of the Ground Forces did not undertake any operational preparations for the offensive, with the exception of those related to Poland, because it considered the ground forces exclusively as a combat-ready means of defense. Contrary to the allegations at the Nuremberg trials of the main German war criminals (1945-1946), that the German General Staff had already developed plans for an offensive against the Western powers even before 1939, today it is firmly established: the first directive of the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops dated October 19, 1939.

Moreover, Hitler imposed this directive on the leading officials of the OKH. After all, back in September, he faced a choice: either to neglect his latest political and just completed military seizures, or to “finally” settle accounts with the Western democracies, which, as he later told the generals, had been opposing the consolidation of the Reich for several decades. Considering the speed with which the German troops, brilliantly led by the OKH and the army group command, marched from success to success in Poland (while France, almost inactive, sat behind their Maginot Line!), and the growing awareness of the fact that Great Britain, entering the war, will fight to the last, Hitler wanted to use the imaginary favorable moment and force the enemy to a decisive battle. At the same time, the problem of neutrality did not play any role for him; if Germany won, no one would ask about it - that was his argument.

An impulsive and shameless course of action, in which he did not consider the views of others and the assessments of the situation by his closest military advisers, led Hitler in October to a hasty decision: while he seemed to have military superiority, it was necessary to attack the Western powers as soon as possible and destroy their. When Hitler, after the so-called peace proposal of October 6, 1939, ordered to speed up operational preparations for the offensive and, without waiting for the Western powers to respond to his proposal, set the first date on November 25, 1939, this caused indignation among the commander of Army Group C, Colonel General von Leeb. He wrote in his diary: “[…] all the orders […] indicate that this crazy offensive against the neutrality of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg is really going to be launched. So, Hitler's speech in the Reichstag was just a deception of the German people. Not only he and the General Staff of the Ground Forces, but also a number of other commanders of the armies involved in the west, rightly doubted that a decisive victory would be achieved that same autumn; in addition, the Polish campaign revealed the obvious shortcomings of the ground forces. At various meetings to discuss the situation, they repeatedly drew Hitler's attention to how little the German army at the moment, in terms of personnel training and armament, meets the high requirements of the march to the west. Of course, based on the experience of the First World War, they assessed the combat capability of the enemy, including the French, very highly. Colonel-General von Brauchitsch [Commander-in-Chief of the Army] tried to do this for the last time in a dramatic conversation with Hitler on November 5, and together with the Chief of his General Staff, General Halder, again and again made attempts to soberly state all military points of view and convince Hitler to use any the possibility of peace. This tragic contradiction (on the one hand, the desire to prevent the expansion of the conflict and turning it into a new world fire, and on the other hand, the need to move ahead with all professionalism the preparations for a military campaign) made the highest demands on their moral sense of responsibility and on their soldierly sense of duty. . The full depth of this conflict with one's own conscience can be appreciated, however, only by one who was forced to act in the same position and received the same upbringing. Today we can only guess what state of internal struggle the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces was in if he wondered whether the elimination of Hitler was the only way out of this tangled situation. But he and his like-minded people did not dare to take this last step, for they believed that such an act would be a violation of tradition, and besides, there is no suitable successor; in addition, the young officer corps, who believed in the Fuhrer, is unreliable, but above all, the mood within the country has not yet matured for this.

When Did Hitler Lose The War?

When Adolf Gitler lost the chance to win World War II?

What was the point in time that before him he could still possibly win the war, and after him his defeat was already a matter of time? (and continued to fight for a long time, which cost a lot of lives).

When did it happen? How soon or how late?

How about starting at a relatively late date, when we are sure that Hitler's defeat was only a matter of time, and from there going back in time to a date that marks the change and shows that Adolf Hitler lost his chance of winning the war which he started. Let's get a look …

Summer 1944. Huge unstoppable forces of the Western Allies are advancing from the west and huge unstoppable Soviet troops are advancing from the east. Devastating massive aerial bombardments, both tactical and strategic, which the exhausted Luftwaffe could no longer stop. German submarines from hunters have now turned into game. Obviously, at this time, Hitler had already lost the war. So this is a good starting point. Now let's take a step back in time.

In mid-1944, before D-Day, Russia was unstoppable even without an invasion of France. The role of the Western allies, of course, was very significant. The threat of invasion, which kept a large part of the German forces in the West, the air war, which increasingly destroyed Germany's ability to support its war economy, and the continued heavy material assistance to Russia from the Western Allies, were all very important factors. But I think we can agree that by the middle of 1944 Germany had already lost the war, because although she continued to fight desperately, she could no longer stop the ongoing advance of Russia throughout Eastern Europe on the way to Berlin.

If we look back in time, we can say with certainty that with the failure of her last major attempt at Kursk in mid-1943, Germany was no longer in a position to defeat Russia.

But in fact, if we look deeper into the details of the situation, we can say that although Kursk was the last major German attempt, and the German army “broke its back” in this attempt, it had no hope even earlier. If we look at the details of the Kursk campaign and the details of the Battle of Stalingrad, then we can go back to the Stalingrad campaign at the end of 1942 and say that when the Soviet troops launched their gigantic counter-offensive and surrounded the large German forces in and near Stalingrad, Germany lost strategic initiative and ability to stop Russia.

But even if Germany quickly took or bypassed Stalingrad in the summer of 1942 and continued to advance further in the endless steppes of southern Russia east and south to the Caspian Sea. Would that change the end result? No, this could only delay it, since the outcome of the war was decided even earlier.

In his book "Modern Times" Paul Johnson clearly marks the exact point in time when the outcome of the war was decided. His analysis is shared by other leading authors and also shared by himself. Winston Churchill at the time these events were taking place. The surviving military accounts of the German generals allow us to see this clearly from the point of view of the German armed forces.

Obviously, Hitler, invading Russia, put everything at stake. Obviously, attacking Russia and failing to defeat her could mean only one thing: that Germany would be defeated.

When the German invasion of Russia began in June 1941, Germany had the potential to defeat Russia and win the war. Her initial victories were huge. Russian losses in manpower, equipment and territories were incredibly huge. But Russia is HUGE, with endless resources, its soldiers are tough, and its winter is terrible for those not fully equipped for it. And the German army was definitely NOT equipped for the Russian winter, and they knew it.

But in the first weeks of the invasion, the German advances were such that the arrogant Hitler decided he wanted to occupy the rich Ukraine in the south even before taking Moscow, Russia's heartland. To do this, he ordered to stop the offensive of Army Group Center on Moscow and transfer its two tank armies to Army Groups North and South. This was perhaps Hitler's biggest mistake, and his generals argued about it a lot, but to no avail.

After spending more than a month on this distraction, on September 6, 1941, Hitler realized that he did not have enough time in his quest to defeat Russia. before winter that his war plan considered as the main condition no alternative.

Then he ordered to concentrate everything in an uncompromising effort to take Moscow. “for a limited time before winter”. Army Group Center received two tank armies back, plus a third tank army, and additional aircraft. On October 2, 1941, the German army launched its last offensive against Moscow. In the 2nd week of October there was a self-confident message from the German radio that the outcome of the war had already been decided and Russia had been defeated.

But then the Russian winter began. Rain and deep mud slowed the German tanks and infantry almost to a halt. The advance resumed a month later when the mud froze over. In German cities, an emergency collection of winter clothes began for unequipped German soldiers in Russia who were still fighting in their summer uniforms.

By the end of November 1941, the German armored wedges had reached a distance of only 27 km from the center of Moscow, but could not advance further due to strong Russian resistance, and the temperature dropped to -34C. Forward German observers could see the tops of the Kremlin towers, but General Erich Hoepner, commander of the forward 4th Panzer Group (Panzer Group 4), reported that his troops “reached their extreme limit, with physical and mental exhaustion, an unbearable shortage of personnel, and no winter clothing”.

General Wagner, the chief logistics and supply officer of the German army, also wrote a report, which was summarized by the chief of staff in the words “we have reached the limit in terms of personnel and equipment”.

And then, on December 6, 1941, the Russian army counterattacked the exhausted Germans with large fresh reinforcements from Siberia and the Far East, and for the first time forced the German troops into a deep retreat.

The next day, December 7, 1941, the Soviet news agency reported the first German defeat since the beginning of the invasion. On the same day at Pearl Harbor, Japan attacked the United States, and the United States, with its huge military potential, entered the war. On this day, Hitler ordered to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.

A week later, General Hoepner reported:

my 22 divisions are opposed by 43 Russian divisions, none of my units are capable of attacking or defending against stronger troops. All my positions are at stake. No fuel, no food for the horses, soldiers fall asleep standing up, everything is frozen, the ground is frozen a meter deep, making digging impossible

As Paul Johnson writes, “At this stage, it became clear that Operation Barbarossa had failed. A completely new strategy was needed.”. Instead, on December 19, 1941, Hitler, the German dictator and former corporal of the First World War, appointed himself the new commander-in-chief of the German army, and since then personally exercised daily military leadership. He no longer trusted his gifted generals, the highly skilled leaders of the most efficient war machine in the world, to win the war for him. He thought he could succeed where they failed, and has since ignored most of their advice. He completely forbade any retreat, which for the rest of the winter cost the German army almost one-third of its personnel in Russia. General Halder wrote “Hitler’s constant underestimation of the enemy becomes grotesque”.

In 1941, Russia experienced a terrible blow. Barely and with terrible losses, but she survived, and from that moment she became even stronger. On the other hand, Germany only pushed itself to the limit and even further, but this was not enough. When the winter was over, she charged forward again with all her remaining strength, and again a year later, when the next winter ended, but it was already too late. The weakened German army could not achieve what it failed to achieve in 1941.

Germany lost the war in December 1941 when it failed in its uncompromising attempt to defeat Russia before winter set in. And, in addition to this, at the moment of Germany's failure, the United States entered the war and its additional huge military potential further ensured Germany's defeat.

We may ask if Germany lost the war even earlier, for example when she failed to defeat Great Britain with aircraft and submarines, leaving her as an important future base for large American forces and the Second Front. Or when she start his invasion of Russia. The answer to this is no. Hitler had options and possibilities until he was at war with Russia, nothing was final yet. When he invaded Russia, he could still do things differently, such as focusing on Moscow from the very beginning and presenting the war as a campaign for liberation from Stalin's brutal regime in order to soften Russia's resistance. But Hitler intervened in the military conduct of the invasion from the very beginning, and the unprecedented brutality of the Nazis, who made it their goal to destroy and enslave them, left the inflexible Russian people no choice but to fight their most brutal war, and use their endless resources much better than ever. In doing so, Hitler lost his last remaining options and his chance of winning the war.

Thus, in December 1941, at the gates of Moscow, Hitler's war was lost. It took more than 3 and a half years until the end of the war, thanks to the outstanding ability to fight and the loyalty of the German soldier, but he could no longer win.