What event happened on Lake Peipsi. Ice battle: the scheme and course of the battle. The myth of the battle on ice and drowned knights

The battle on the ice is one of the greatest battles in Russian history, during which Prince Alexander Nevsky of Novgorod repulsed the invasion of the knights of the Livonian Order on Lake Peipus. For centuries, historians have debated the details of this battle. Some points remain not completely clear, including how exactly the Battle of the Ice took place. The scheme and reconstruction of the details of this battle will allow us to unravel the mystery of the mysteries of history associated with the great battle.

Background to the conflict

Starting in 1237, when he announced the start of another crusade to the lands of the eastern Baltic, between the Russian principalities on the one hand, and Sweden, Denmark and the German Livonian Order on the other, there was constant tension, which from time to time escalated into hostilities.

So, in 1240, the Swedish knights, led by Jarl Birger, landed at the mouth of the Neva, but the Novgorod army, led by Prince Alexander Nevsky, defeated them in a decisive battle.

In the same year, he undertook an offensive operation on Russian lands. His troops took Izborsk and Pskov. Assessing the danger, in 1241 Alexander was called back to reign, although he had only recently expelled him. The prince gathered a squad and moved against the Livonians. In March 1242, he managed to free Pskov. Alexander moved his troops to the possessions of the Order, in the direction of the Derpt bishopric, where the crusaders gathered significant forces. The parties prepared for the decisive battle.

Opponents met on April 5, 1242 on the then still covered with ice. That is why the battle later acquired the name - Battle on the Ice. The lake at that time was frozen deep enough to withstand heavily armed warriors.

Side forces

The Russian army was rather fragmented. But the backbone of it, of course, was the Novgorod squad. In addition, the army included the so-called "grassroots regiments", which led the boyars. The total number of the Russian squad is estimated by historians at 15-17 thousand people.

The army of the Livonians was also of various colors. Its combat backbone was made up of heavily armed knights led by master Andreas von Welwen, who, however, did not take part in the battle itself. Also in the army were Danish allies and the militia of the city of Dorpat, which included a significant number of Estonians. The total number of the Livonian army is estimated at 10-12 thousand people.

The course of the battle

Historical sources have left us rather scarce information about how the battle itself unfolded. The battle on the ice began with the fact that the archers of the Novgorod army came forward and covered the formation of knights with a hail of arrows. But the latter succeeded, using a military formation called "pig", to crush the shooters and break the center of Russian forces.

Seeing this situation, Alexander Nevsky ordered to cover the Livonian troops from the flanks. The knights were taken in pincers. Their wholesale extermination by the Russian squad began. The auxiliary troops of the order, seeing that their main forces were being defeated, rushed to flight. The Novgorod squad pursued the fleeing for more than seven kilometers. The battle ended with the complete victory of the Russian forces.

Such was the history of the Battle of the Ice.

Battle scheme

It is not for nothing that the Scheme below occupied a worthy place in domestic textbooks on military affairs. It clearly demonstrates the military leadership gift of Alexander Nevsky and serves as an example of an excellent military operation.

On the map, we clearly see the initial breakthrough of the Livonian army into the ranks of the Russian squad. It also shows the encirclement of the knights and the subsequent flight of the auxiliary forces of the Order, which ended the Battle on the Ice. The scheme allows you to build these events into a single chain and greatly facilitates the reconstruction of the events that took place during the battle.

Aftermath of the battle

After the Novgorod army won a complete victory over the forces of the crusaders, in which Alexander Nevsky made a great merit, a peace agreement was signed in which the Livonian Order completely abandoned its recent acquisitions on the territory of Russian lands. There was also an exchange of prisoners.

The defeat that the Order suffered in the Battle of the Ice was so serious that for ten years it licked its wounds and did not even think about a new invasion of Russian lands.

The victory of Alexander Nevsky is no less significant in the general historical context. After all, it was then that the fate of our lands was decided and the actual end of the aggression of the German crusaders in the east was put. Of course, even after that, the Order tried more than once to tear off a piece of Russian land, but the invasion had never taken on such a large-scale character.

Misconceptions and stereotypes associated with the battle

There is an idea that in many ways in the battle on Lake Peipus, the Russian army was helped by ice, which could not withstand the weight of heavily armed German knights and began to fall under them. In fact, there is no historical confirmation of this fact. Moreover, according to the latest research, the weight of the equipment of the German knights and Russian knights participating in the battle was approximately equal.

The German crusaders, in the view of many people, which is primarily inspired by cinema, are heavily armed men at arms in helmets, often decorated with horns. In fact, the charter of the Order forbade the use of helmet decorations. So, in principle, the Livonians could not have any horns.

Results

Thus, we found out that one of the most important and iconic battles in Russian history was the Battle of the Ice. The scheme of the battle allowed us to visually reproduce its course and determine the main reason for the defeat of the knights - the overestimation of their forces when they recklessly rushed to the attack.

Myths about the Ice Battle

Snow-covered landscapes, thousands of warriors, a frozen lake and crusaders falling through the ice under the weight of their own armor.

For many, the battle, according to the annals, which took place on April 5, 1242, is not much different from the shots from Sergei Eisenstein's film "Alexander Nevsky".

But was it really so?

The myth of what we know about the Battle of the Ice

The battle on the ice really became one of the most resonant events of the 13th century, reflected not only in "domestic", but also in Western chronicles.

And at first glance it seems that we have enough documents in order to thoroughly study all the "components" of the battle.

But upon closer examination, it turns out that the popularity of a historical plot is by no means a guarantee of its comprehensive study.

Thus, the most detailed (and most quoted) description of the battle, recorded "in hot pursuit", is contained in the Novgorod First Chronicle of the senior version. And this description has just over 100 words. The rest of the references are even more concise.

Moreover, sometimes they include mutually exclusive information. For example, in the most authoritative Western source - the Senior Livonian rhymed chronicle - there is not a word that the battle took place on the lake.

The lives of Alexander Nevsky can be considered a kind of "synthesis" of early annalistic references to the collision, but, according to experts, they are a literary work and therefore can be used as a source only with "great restrictions."

As for the historical works of the 19th century, it is believed that they did not bring anything fundamentally new to the study of the Battle on the Ice, mainly retelling what was already stated in the annals.

The beginning of the 20th century is characterized by an ideological rethinking of the battle, when the symbolic meaning of the victory over the "German-knightly aggression" was brought to the fore. According to historian Igor Danilevsky, before the release of Sergei Eisenstein's film "Alexander Nevsky", the study of the Battle on the Ice was not even included in university lecture courses.

The myth of a united Rus'

In the minds of many, the Battle on the Ice is the victory of the united Russian troops over the forces of the German crusaders. Such a "generalizing" idea of ​​the battle was already formed in the 20th century, in the realities of the Great Patriotic War, when Germany was the main rival of the USSR.

However, 775 years ago, the Battle of the Ice was more of a "local" than a nationwide conflict. In the 13th century, Rus' experienced a period of feudal fragmentation and consisted of approximately 20 independent principalities. Moreover, the policies of cities that formally belonged to the same territory could differ significantly.

So, de jure Pskov and Novgorod were located in the Novgorod land, one of the largest territorial units of Rus' at that time. De facto, each of these cities was "autonomy", with its own political and economic interests. This also applied to relations with the closest neighbors in the Eastern Baltic.

One of these neighbors was the Catholic Order of the Sword, after the defeat in the battle of Saul (Shauliai) in 1236, attached to the Teutonic Order as the Livonian Landmaster. The latter became part of the so-called Livonian Confederation, which, in addition to the Order, included five Baltic bishoprics.

As the historian Igor Danilevsky notes, the main reason for the territorial conflicts between Novgorod and the Order were the lands of the Estonians who lived on the western shore of Lake Peipsi (the medieval population of modern Estonia, in most Russian-language chronicles, appeared under the name "chud"). At the same time, the campaigns organized by the Novgorodians practically did not affect the interests of other lands. The exception was the "border" Pskov, which was constantly subjected to retaliatory raids by the Livonians.

According to the historian Alexei Valerov, it was the need to simultaneously resist both the forces of the Order and the regular attempts of Novgorod to encroach on the independence of the city that could force Pskov in 1240 to “open the gates” to the Livonians. In addition, the city was seriously weakened after the defeat at Izborsk and, presumably, was not capable of long-term resistance to the crusaders.

At the same time, according to the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle, in 1242, not a full-fledged "German army" was present in the city, but only two Vogt knights (presumably accompanied by small detachments), who, according to Valerov, performed judicial functions on controlled lands and monitored the activities of the "local Pskov administration".

Further, as we know from the annals, Prince Alexander Yaroslavich of Novgorod, together with his younger brother Andrei Yaroslavich (sent by their father, Vladimir Prince Yaroslav Vsevolodovich), "expelled" the Germans from Pskov, after which they continued their campaign, setting off "to the Chud" (i.e. e. to the lands of the Livonian Landmaster).

Where they were met by the combined forces of the Order and the Bishop of Dorpat.

The myth of the scale of the battle

Thanks to the Novgorod chronicle, we know that April 5, 1242 was a Saturday. Everything else is not so clear.

Difficulties begin already when trying to establish the number of participants in the battle. The only figures we have are those of German casualties. So, the Novgorod First Chronicle reports about 400 killed and 50 prisoners, the Livonian rhymed chronicle - that "twenty brothers remained killed and six were captured."

The researchers believe that these data are not as contradictory as it seems at first glance.

Historians Igor Danilevsky and Klim Zhukov agree that several hundred people participated in the battle.

So, on the part of the Germans, these are 35–40 knight brothers, about 160 knechts (on average, four servants per knight) and Estonian mercenaries (“chud without number”), who could “expand” the detachment by another 100–200 soldiers . At the same time, by the standards of the 13th century, such an army was considered a fairly serious force (presumably, during the heyday, the maximum number of the former Order of the Sword-bearers, in principle, did not exceed 100–120 knights). The author of the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle also complained that there were almost 60 times more Russians, which, according to Danilevsky, although an exaggeration, still suggests that Alexander's army significantly outnumbered the Crusaders.

So, the maximum number of the Novgorod city regiment, the princely squad of Alexander, the Suzdal detachment of his brother Andrei and the Pskovites who joined the campaign was unlikely to exceed 800 people.

From chronicles we also know that the German detachment was lined up by a "pig".

According to Klim Zhukov, most likely, this is not about the "trapezoid" pig, which we are used to seeing in the diagrams in textbooks, but about the "rectangular" one (since the first description of the "trapezium" in written sources appeared only in the 15th century). Also, according to historians, the estimated size of the Livonian army gives grounds to talk about the traditional construction of the "hound banner": 35 knights that make up the "wedge banner", plus their detachments (up to 400 people in total).

As for the tactics of the Russian army, the Rhymed Chronicle only mentions that "the Russians had many shooters" (who, apparently, made up the first line), and that "the brothers' army was surrounded."

We don't know anything more about this.

The myth that the Livonian warrior is heavier than the Novgorod one

There is also a stereotype according to which the combat attire of Russian soldiers was many times lighter than the Livonian one.

According to historians, if there was a difference in weight, it was extremely insignificant.

Indeed, on both sides, exclusively heavily armed horsemen participated in the battle (it is believed that all assumptions about infantrymen are a transfer of the military realities of subsequent centuries to the realities of the XIII century).

Logically, even the weight of a war horse, without taking into account the rider, would be enough to break through the fragile April ice.

So did it make sense in such conditions to withdraw troops to it?

The myth of the battle on ice and drowned knights

Let's disappoint right away: there are no descriptions of how the German knights fall through the ice in any of the early chronicles.

Moreover, in the Livonian Chronicle there is a rather strange phrase: "On both sides, the dead fell on the grass." Some commentators believe that this is an idiom meaning "fall on the battlefield" (version of the medievalist historian Igor Kleinenberg), others - that we are talking about thickets of reeds that made their way from under the ice in shallow water, where the battle took place (version of the Soviet military historian Georgy Karaev, displayed on the map).

As for the chronicles mentioning that the Germans were driven "on the ice", modern researchers agree that the Battle on the Ice could "borrow" this detail from the description of the later Battle of Rakovor (1268). According to Igor Danilevsky, reports that the Russian troops drove the enemy seven miles ("to the Subolichi coast") are quite justified for the scale of the Rakovor battle, but they look strange in the context of the battle on Lake Peipsi, where the distance from coast to coast at the supposed location battle is no more than 2 km.

Speaking of the "Raven Stone" (a geographical landmark mentioned in part of the annals), historians emphasize that any map indicating a specific battle site is nothing more than a version. Where exactly the massacre took place, no one knows: the sources contain too little information to draw any conclusions.

In particular, Klim Zhukov is based on the fact that during the archaeological expeditions in the area of ​​Lake Peipus not a single "confirming" burial was found. The researcher connects the lack of evidence not with the mythical nature of the battle, but with looting: in the 13th century, iron was highly valued, and it is unlikely that the weapons and armor of the dead soldiers could have been preserved to this day.

The myth of the geopolitical significance of the battle

In the view of many, the Battle on the Ice "stands apart" and is perhaps the only "action-packed" battle of its time. And it really became one of the most significant battles of the Middle Ages, "suspending" the conflict between Rus' and the Livonian Order for almost 10 years.

Nevertheless, the XIII century is rich in other events.

From the point of view of the clash with the crusaders, they include the battle with the Swedes on the Neva in 1240, and the already mentioned battle of Rakovor, during which the combined army of the seven northern Russian principalities opposed the Livonian Landmaster and Danish Estland.

Also, the XIII century is the time of the Horde invasion.

Despite the fact that the key battles of this era (the Battle of Kalka and the capture of Ryazan) did not directly affect the North-West, they significantly influenced the further political structure of medieval Rus' and all its components.

In addition, if we compare the scale of the Teutonic and Horde threats, then the difference is calculated in tens of thousands of soldiers. Thus, the maximum number of crusaders who ever participated in campaigns against Rus' rarely exceeded 1000 people, while the alleged maximum number of participants in the Russian campaign from the Horde was up to 40 thousand (version of the historian Klim Zhukov).

TASS expresses gratitude for the help in preparing the material to the historian and specialist in Ancient Rus' Igor Nikolaevich Danilevsky and the military medievalist historian Klim Aleksandrovich Zhukov.

© TASS INFOGRAPHICS, 2017

Materials worked on:

There is an episode with Raven Stone. According to ancient legend, he rose from the waters of the lake at times of danger to the Russian land, helping to crush the enemies. So it was in 1242. This date appears in all domestic historical sources, being inextricably linked with the Battle of the Ice.

It is not by chance that we focus your attention on this particular stone. After all, historians are guided by it, who are still trying to understand on which lake it happened. After all, many specialists who work with historical archives still do not know where our ancestors actually fought with

The official point of view is that the battle took place on the ice of Lake Peipus. Today, it is only known for certain that the battle took place on April 5. Year of the Battle on the Ice - 1242 from the beginning of our era. In the annals of Novgorod and in the Livonian chronicle, there is not a single coinciding detail at all: the number of soldiers participating in the battle and the number of wounded and killed also differ.

We don't even know the details of what happened. Only information has reached us that a victory was won on Lake Peipus, and even then in a significantly distorted, transformed form. This is in stark contrast to the official version, but in recent years, the voices of those scientists who insist on full-scale excavations and repeated archival research have been heard more and more loudly. All of them want not only to know on which lake the Battle of the Ice took place, but also to find out all the details of the event.

Official description of the course of the battle

The opposing armies met in the morning. It was 1242, the ice had not yet broken. The Russian troops had many riflemen who courageously stepped forward, taking the brunt of the German attack. Pay attention to how the Livonian Chronicle says: “The banners of the brothers (German knights) penetrated the ranks of the shooters ... many of the dead from both sides fell on the grass (!)”.

Thus, the "Chronicles" and the manuscripts of the Novgorodians in this moment completely converge. Indeed, a detachment of light shooters stood in front of the Russian army. As the Germans later found out from their sad experience, it was a trap. "Heavy" columns of German infantry broke through the ranks of lightly armed soldiers and went on. We did not just write the first word in quotation marks. Why? We will talk about this below.

Russian mobile units quickly surrounded the Germans from the flanks, and then began to destroy them. The Germans fled, and the Novgorod army pursued them for about seven miles. It is noteworthy that even at this point there are disagreements in various sources. If you describe the Battle on the Ice briefly, then in this case this episode raises some questions.

The Importance of Winning

So, most of the witnesses say nothing at all about the "drowned" knights. Part of the German army was surrounded. Many knights were taken prisoner. In principle, 400 fallen Germans are reported, and another fifty people were captured. Chud, according to the chronicles, "fell without number." That's all Battle on the Ice briefly.

The Order took the defeat painfully. In the same year, peace was concluded with Novgorod, the Germans completely abandoned their conquests not only in the territory of Rus', but also in Letgol. There was even a complete exchange of prisoners. However, the Teutons tried to recapture Pskov after a dozen years. Thus, the year of the Battle on the Ice became an extremely important date, as it allowed the Russian state to somewhat calm down its warlike neighbors.

About common myths

Even local history museums are very skeptical about the widespread statement about the "heavy" German knights. Allegedly, because of their massive armor, they almost drowned in the waters of the lake at once. Many historians with rare enthusiasm broadcast that the Germans in their armor weighed "three times more" than the average Russian warrior.

But any armament specialist of that era will tell you with confidence that the soldiers on both sides were protected approximately the same.

Armor is not for everyone!

The fact is that massive armor, which can be found everywhere on the miniatures of the Battle on the Ice in history books, appeared only in the XIV-XV centuries. In the 13th century, warriors wore a steel helmet, chain mail, or (the latter were very expensive and rare), bracers and leggings were put on their limbs. All this weighed twenty kilograms maximum. Most of the German and Russian soldiers did not have such protection at all.

Finally, there was no particular point in such heavily armed infantry on the ice in principle. Everyone fought on foot, there was no need to be afraid of a cavalry attack. So why take the risk once again, going out on the thin April ice in such an amount of iron?

But at school, the 4th grade studies the Battle on the Ice, and therefore no one simply goes into such subtleties.

Water or land?

According to the generally accepted conclusions made by the expedition led by the USSR Academy of Sciences (headed by Karaev), the place of the battle is considered to be a small area of ​​the Warm Lake (part of Peipsi), which is located at a distance of 400 meters from the modern Cape Sigovets.

For almost half a century, no one doubted the results of these studies. The fact is that then scientists did a really great job, analyzing not only historical sources, but also hydrology, and as the writer Vladimir Potresov, who was a direct participant in that very expedition, explains, they managed to create a “holistic vision of the problem”. So on which lake did the Battle of the Ice take place?

Here the conclusion is the same - on Chudsky. There was a battle, and it took place somewhere in those parts, but there are still problems with determining the exact localization.

What did the researchers find out?

First of all, they read the chronicle again. It said that the slaughter was "on Uzmeni, at Voronei's stone." Imagine that you are telling your friend how to get to the stop, using terms that you and him understand. If you tell the same thing to a resident of another region, he may not understand. We are in the same position. What is Uzmen? What Raven Stone? Where was all this?

More than seven centuries have passed since then. Rivers changed their channels in less time! So there was absolutely nothing left of the real geographical coordinates. If we assume that the battle, in one way or another, really took place on the icy surface of the lake, then finding something becomes even more difficult.

German version

Seeing the difficulties of their Soviet colleagues, in the 30s a group of German scientists hastened to declare that the Russians ... invented the Battle of the Ice! Alexander Nevsky, they say, simply created for himself the image of a winner in order to give his figure more weight in the political arena. But the old German chronicles also told about the episode of the battle, so there really was a battle.

Russian scientists had real verbal battles! Everyone tried to find out the place of the battle that took place in ancient times. Everyone called “the same” piece of territory either on the western or on the eastern shore of the lake. Someone argued that the battle took place in general in the central part of the reservoir. In general, there was trouble with the Raven Stone: either mountains of small pebbles at the bottom of the lake were mistaken for it, or someone saw it in every ledge of rock on the banks of the reservoir. There were many disputes, but the matter did not move at all.

In 1955, everyone was tired of this, and the same expedition set off. Archaeologists, philologists, geologists and hydrographers, specialists in the Slavic and German dialects of that time, and cartographers appeared on the shores of Lake Peipus. Everyone was interested in where the Battle of the Ice took place. Alexander Nevsky was here, this is known for certain, but where did his troops meet with adversaries?

Several boats with teams of experienced divers were given to the full disposal of scientists. Many enthusiasts, schoolchildren from local historical societies also worked on the shores of the lake. So what gave the researchers Lake Peipsi? Nevsky was here with the army?

Raven stone

For a long time, among domestic scientists, there was an opinion that the Raven Stone was the key to all the secrets of the Battle on the Ice. His search was given special importance. Finally he was discovered. It turned out that it was a rather high stone ledge on the western tip of the island of Gorodets. For seven centuries, not too dense rock was almost completely destroyed by winds and water.

At the foot of the Raven Stone, archaeologists quickly found the remains of Russian guard fortifications that blocked the passages to Novgorod and Pskov. So those places were really well known to contemporaries because of their importance.

New contradictions

That's just the location of such an important landmark in antiquity did not mean establishing the place where the massacre took place on Lake Peipus. Quite the opposite: the currents here are always so strong that ice as such does not exist here in principle. Arrange a battle here between the Russians and the Germans, everyone would drown, regardless of the armor. The chronicler, as was the custom of the time, simply indicated the Raven Stone as the nearest landmark that was visible from the battlefield.

Event versions

If we return to the description of the events, which is given at the very beginning of the article, then you will surely remember the expression "... many of those killed on both sides fell on the grass." Of course, "grass" in this case could be an idiom denoting the very fact of a fall, death. But today, historians are increasingly inclined to believe that archaeological evidence of that battle should be sought precisely on the banks of the reservoir.

In addition, not a single armor has yet been found at the bottom of Lake Peipus. Neither Russian nor Teutonic. Of course, there were very few armor as such (we have already talked about their high cost), but at least something should have remained! Especially when you consider how many diving dives were made.

Thus, we can make a quite convincing conclusion that the ice, under the weight of the Germans, who did not differ too much in armament from our soldiers, did not break through. In addition, finding armor even at the bottom of the lake is unlikely to prove anything for sure: more archaeological evidence is needed, since border clashes in those places happened all the time.

In general terms, it is clear on which lake the Battle of the Ice took place. The question of where exactly the slaughter took place still worries domestic and foreign historians.

Monument to the iconic battle

The monument in honor of this significant event was erected in 1993. It is located in the city of Pskov, installed on Mount Sokolikha. The monument is more than a hundred kilometers away from the theoretical place of the battle. This stele is dedicated to the "Druzhinniks of Alexander Nevsky". Patrons collected money for it, which in those years was an incredibly difficult matter. That is why this monument has even greater value for the history of our country.

Artistic embodiment

In the very first sentence, we mentioned the film by Sergei Eisenstein, which he made back in 1938. The tape was called "Alexander Nevsky". That's just not worth considering this magnificent (from an artistic point of view) film as a historical tool. Absurdities and obviously unreliable facts are present there in abundance.

And the people of Vladimir, led by Alexander Nevsky, on the one hand, and the army of the Livonian Order, on the other hand.

The opposing armies met on the morning of April 5, 1242. The Rhymed Chronicle describes the moment of the beginning of the battle as follows:

Thus, the news of the "Chronicle" about the order of battle of the Russians as a whole is combined with the reports of the Russian chronicles about the allocation of a separate rifle regiment in front of the center of the main forces (since 1185).

In the center, the Germans broke through the Russian line:

But then the troops of the Teutonic Order were surrounded by the Russians from the flanks and destroyed, and other German detachments retreated to avoid the same fate: the Russians pursued those fleeing on the ice for 7 miles. It is noteworthy that, unlike the battle of Omovzha in 1234, sources close to the time of the battle do not report that the Germans fell through the ice; according to Donald Ostrovsky, this information penetrated into later sources from the description of the 1016 battle between Yaroslav and Svyatopolk in The Tale of Bygone Years and The Tale of Boris and Gleb.

In the same year, the Teutonic Order concluded a peace treaty with Novgorod, relinquishing all their recent seizures, not only in Rus', but also in Letgol. There was also an exchange of prisoners. Only 10 years later, the Teutons tried to recapture Pskov.

Scale and significance of the battle

The Chronicle says that in the battle there were 60 Russians for every German (which is recognized as an exaggeration), and the loss of 20 knights killed and 6 captured in the battle. “Chronicle of the Grand Masters” (“Die jungere Hochmeisterchronik”, sometimes translated as “Chronicle of the Teutonic Order”), an official history of the Teutonic Order, written much later, speaks of the death of 70 order knights (literally “70 order gentlemen”, “seuentich Ordens Herenn” ), but unites the dead during the capture of Pskov by Alexander and on Lake Peipus.

According to the point of view traditional in Russian historiography, this battle, together with the victories of Prince Alexander over the Swedes (July 15, 1240 on the Neva) and over the Lithuanians (in 1245 near Toropets, near Lake Zhiztsa and near Usvyat), was of great importance for Pskov and Novgorod, holding back the pressure of three serious enemies from the west - at the very time when the rest of Russia was greatly weakened by the Mongol invasion. In Novgorod, the Battle on the Ice, together with the Neva victory over the Swedes, was remembered at litanies in all Novgorod churches back in the 16th century. In Soviet historiography, the Battle of the Ice was considered one of the largest battles in the entire history of German-knightly aggression in the Baltic states, and the number of troops on Lake Peipsi was estimated at 10-12 thousand people at the Order and 15-17 thousand people from Novgorod and their allies (the last figure corresponds to the assessment by Henry of Latvia of the number of Russian troops when describing their campaigns in the Baltic states in the 1210-1220s), that is, approximately at the same level as in the Battle of Grunwald () - up to 11 thousand people at the Order and 16-17 thousand people in the Polish-Lithuanian army. The Chronicle, as a rule, reports on the small number of Germans in those battles that they lost, but even in it the Battle on the Ice is unambiguously described as a defeat of the Germans, in contrast, for example, to the Battle of Rakovor ().

As a rule, the minimum estimates of the number of troops and losses of the Order in the battle correspond to the historical role assigned by specific researchers to this battle and the figure of Alexander Nevsky as a whole (for more details, see Estimates of the activities of Alexander Nevsky). In general, V. O. Klyuchevsky and M. N. Pokrovsky did not mention the battle in their writings.

The English researcher J. Fennel believes that the significance of the Battle of the Ice (and the Battle of the Neva) is greatly exaggerated: “Alexander did only what the numerous defenders of Novgorod and Pskov did before him and what many did after him - namely, they rushed to protect the extended and vulnerable borders from invaders. Russian professor I. N. Danilevsky agrees with this opinion. He notes, in particular, that the battle was inferior in scale to the battle of Saul (1236), in which the master of the order and 48 knights were killed by the Lithuanians, and the battle of Rakovor; contemporary sources even describe the Battle of the Neva in more detail and attach more importance to it. However, in Russian historiography, it is not customary to remember the defeat at Saul, since the Pskovites took part in it on the side of the defeated knights.

German historians believe that while fighting on the western borders, Alexander Nevsky did not pursue any coherent political program, but successes in the West provided some compensation for the horrors of the Mongol invasion. Many researchers believe that the very scale of the threat that the West posed to Rus' is exaggerated. On the other hand, L. N. Gumilyov, on the contrary, believed that it was not the Tatar-Mongol "yoke", but precisely Catholic Western Europe, represented by the Teutonic Order and the Archbishopric of Riga, that posed a mortal threat to the very existence of Rus', and therefore the role of the victories of Alexander Nevsky in Russian history is especially great.

The battle on the ice played a role in the formation of the Russian national myth, in which Alexander Nevsky was assigned the role of "defender of Orthodoxy and the Russian land" in the face of the "Western threat"; victory in battle was seen as justification for the prince's political moves in the 1250s. The cult of Nevsky was especially actualized in the Stalin era, serving as a kind of visual historical example for the cult of Stalin himself. The cornerstone of the Stalinist myth about Alexander Yaroslavich and the Battle of the Ice was a film by Sergei Eisenstein (see below) .

On the other hand, it is wrong to assume that the Battle on the Ice became popular in the scientific community and among the general public only after the appearance of Eisenstein's film. “Schlacht auf dem Eise”, “Schlacht auf dem Peipussee”, “Prœlium glaciale” [Battle on ice (us.), Battle on Lake Peipus (German), Ice battle (lat.)] - such well-established concepts are found in Western sources long before the director's work. This battle was and will forever remain in the memory of the Russian people, just like, say, the battle of Borodino, which, according to a strict view, cannot be called victorious - the Russian army left the battlefield. And for us this great battle, which played an important role in the outcome of the war.

The memory of the battle

Movies

Music

• The musical score for the Eisenstein film, composed by Sergei Prokofiev, is a cantata celebrating the events of the battle.

Literature

monuments

Monument to the squads of Alexander Nevsky on Mount Sokolikh

Monument to Alexander Nevsky and Poklonny Cross

The bronze worship cross was cast in St. Petersburg at the expense of patrons of the Baltic Steel Group (A. V. Ostapenko). The prototype was the Novgorod Alekseevsky cross. The author of the project is A. A. Seleznev. A bronze sign was cast under the direction of D. Gochiyaev by the foundry workers of ZAO NTTsKT, architects B. Kostygov and S. Kryukov. During the implementation of the project, fragments from the lost wooden cross by sculptor V. Reshchikov were used.

Commemorative cross for prince "s armed force of Alexander Nevsky (Kobylie Gorodishe).jpg

Memorial cross to the squads of Alexander Nevsky

Monument in honor of the 750th anniversary of the battle

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Monument in honor of the 750th anniversary of the battle (fragment)

In philately and on coins

Data

In connection with the incorrect calculation of the date of the battle according to the new style, the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the victory of Russian soldiers of Prince Alexander Nevsky over the crusaders (established by Federal Law No. 32-FZ of March 13, 1995 "On the days of military glory and memorable dates of Russia") is celebrated on 18 April instead of the correct one according to the new style on April 12. The difference between the old (Julian) and the new (Gregorian, first introduced in 1582) style in the 13th century would be 7 days (counting from April 5, 1242), and the difference between them of 13 days takes place only in the period 03/14/1900-03/14 .2100 (new style). In other words, Victory Day on Lake Peipsi (April 5, old style) is celebrated on April 18, which really falls on April 5, old style, but only now (1900-2099).

At the end of the 20th century in Russia and some republics of the former USSR, many political organizations celebrated the unofficial holiday Day of the Russian Nation (April 5), designed to become the date of unity of all patriotic forces.

On April 22, 2012, on the occasion of the 770th anniversary of the Battle on the Ice in the village of Samolva, Gdov District, Pskov Region, the Museum of the History of the Expedition of the USSR Academy of Sciences to clarify the location of the Battle on the Ice of 1242 was opened.

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Notes

2. Razin E. A.
3. Uzhankov A.
6. Battle on the Ice of 1242: Proceedings of a comprehensive expedition to clarify the location of the Battle on the Ice. - M.-L., 1966. - 253 p. - S. 60-64.
7. . Its date is considered more preferable, since, in addition to the number, it also contains a link to the day of the week and church holidays (the day of memory of the martyr Claudius and praise of the Virgin). In the Pskov Chronicles, the date is April 1.
8. Donald Ostrowski(English) // Russian History/Histoire Russe. - 2006. - Vol. 33, no. 2-3-4. - P. 304-307.
9. .
10. .
11. Heinrich of Latvia. .
12. Razin E. A. .
13. Danilevsky, I.. Polit.ru. April 15, 2005.
14. Dittmar Dahlmann. Der russische Sieg über die "teutonische Ritter" auf der Peipussee 1242// Schlachtenmythen: Ereignis - Erzählung - Erinnerung. Herausgegeben von Gerd Krumeich and Susanne Brandt. (Europäische Geschichtsdarstellungen. Herausgegeben von Johannes Laudage. - Band 2.) - Wien-Köln-Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2003. - S. 63-76.
15. Werner Philipp. Heiligkeit und Herrschaft in der Vita Aleksandr Nevskijs // Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte. - Band 18. - Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1973. - S. 55-72.
16. Janet Martin. Medieval Russia 980-1584. second edition. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. - P. 181.
17. . gumilevica.kulichki.net. Retrieved 22 September 2016.
20. // Gdovskaya dawn: newspaper. - 30.3.2007.
24. (unavailable link from 25-05-2013 (2231 days) - story , copy) //Official site of the Pskov region, July 12, 2006]
27. .
28. .
29. .

Literature

• Lipitsky S.V. Battle on the Ice. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1964. - 68 p. - (The heroic past of our Motherland).
• Mansikka V.J. Life of Alexander Nevsky: Analysis of editions and text. - St. Petersburg, 1913. - "Monuments of ancient writing." - Issue. 180.
• Life of Alexander Nevsky / Preparatory work. text, translation and comm. V. I. Okhotnikova // Monuments of literature of Ancient Rus': XIII century. - M.: Fiction, 1981.
• Begunov Yu.K. Monument of Russian literature of the XIII century: "The word about the destruction of the Russian land" - M.-L.: Nauka, 1965.
• Pashuto V. T. Alexander Nevsky - M .: Young Guard, 1974. - 160 p. - Series "Life of remarkable people".
• Karpov A. Yu. Alexander Nevsky - M.: Young Guard, 2010. - 352 p. - Series "Life of remarkable people".
• Khitrov M. Holy Blessed Grand Duke Alexander Yaroslavovich Nevsky. Detailed biography. - Minsk: Panorama, 1991. - 288 p. - Reprint ed.
• Klepinin N. A. Holy Blessed and Grand Duke Alexander Nevsky. - St. Petersburg: Aleteyya, 2004. - 288 p. - Series "Slavonic Library".
• Prince Alexander Nevsky and his era: Research and materials / Ed. Yu. K. Begunov and A. N. Kirpichnikov. - St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 1995. - 214 p.
• Fennell J. The Crisis of Medieval Rus'. 1200-1304 - M.: Progress, 1989. - 296 p.
• Battle on the Ice of 1242: Proceedings of a comprehensive expedition to clarify the location of the Battle on the Ice / Ed. ed. G. N. Karaev. - M.-L.: Nauka, 1966. - 241 p.
• Tikhomirov M. N. About the place of the Battle of the Ice // Tikhomirov M. N. Ancient Rus': Sat. Art. / Ed. A. V. Artsikhovsky and M. T. Belyavsky, with the participation of N. B. Shelamanov. - M .: Nauka, 1975. - S. 368-374. - 432 p. - 16,000 copies.(in lane, superregional)
• Nesterenko A. N. Alexander Nevsky. Who won the Ice Battle., 2006. Olma-Press.

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An excerpt characterizing the Battle of the Ice

His illness followed its own physical order, but what Natasha called it happened to him, happened to him two days before Princess Mary's arrival. It was that last moral struggle between life and death in which death triumphed. It was an unexpected realization that he still cherished life, which seemed to him in love for Natasha, and the last, subdued fit of horror before the unknown.
It was in the evening. He was, as usual after dinner, in a slight feverish state, and his thoughts were extremely clear. Sonya was sitting at the table. He dozed off. Suddenly a feeling of happiness swept over him.
“Ah, she came in!” he thought.
Indeed, Natasha, who had just entered with inaudible steps, was sitting in Sonya's place.
Ever since she'd followed him, he'd always had that physical sensation of her closeness. She was sitting on an armchair, sideways to him, blocking the light of the candle from him, and knitting a stocking. (She had learned to knit stockings ever since Prince Andrei had told her that no one knows how to look after the sick as well as old nannies who knit stockings, and that there is something soothing in knitting a stocking.) Her thin fingers quickly fingered from time to time spokes colliding, and the thoughtful profile of her lowered face was clearly visible to him. She made a move - the ball rolled from her knees. She shuddered, looked back at him, and shielding the candle with her hand, with a careful, flexible and precise movement, bent over, picked up the ball and sat down in her former position.
He looked at her without moving, and saw that after her movement she needed to take a deep breath, but she did not dare to do this and carefully caught her breath.
In the Trinity Lavra they talked about the past, and he told her that if he were alive, he would thank God forever for his wound, which brought him back to her; but since then they have never talked about the future.
“Could it or couldn’t it be? he thought now, looking at her and listening to the light steely sound of the spokes. “Is it really only then that fate brought me so strangely together with her in order for me to die? .. Was it possible that the truth of life was revealed to me only so that I would live in a lie?” I love her more than anything in the world. But what should I do if I love her? he said, and he suddenly groaned involuntarily, out of a habit he had acquired during his suffering.
Hearing this sound, Natasha put down her stocking, leaned closer to him, and suddenly, noticing his luminous eyes, went up to him with a light step and bent down.
- You are not asleep?
- No, I have been looking at you for a long time; I felt when you entered. Nobody like you, but gives me that soft silence... that light. I just want to cry with joy.
Natasha moved closer to him. Her face shone with ecstatic joy.
“Natasha, I love you too much. More than anything else.
- And I? She turned away for a moment. - Why too much? - she said.
- Why too much? .. Well, what do you think, how do you feel to your heart, to your heart's content, will I be alive? What do you think?
- I'm sure, I'm sure! - Natasha almost screamed, passionately taking him by both hands.
He paused.
- How nice! And taking her hand, he kissed it.
Natasha was happy and excited; and at once she remembered that this was impossible, that he needed calmness.
"But you didn't sleep," she said, suppressing her joy. “Try to sleep…please.”
He released her, shaking her hand, she went to the candle and again sat down in her previous position. Twice she looked back at him, his eyes shining towards her. She gave herself a lesson on the stocking and told herself that until then she would not look back until she finished it.
Indeed, soon after that he closed his eyes and fell asleep. He didn't sleep long and suddenly woke up in a cold sweat.
Falling asleep, he thought about the same thing that he thought about from time to time - about life and death. And more about death. He felt closer to her.
"Love? What is love? he thought. “Love interferes with death. Love is life. Everything, everything that I understand, I understand only because I love. Everything is, everything exists only because I love. Everything is connected by her. Love is God, and to die means for me, a particle of love, to return to the common and eternal source. These thoughts seemed to him comforting. But these were only thoughts. Something was lacking in them, something that was one-sidedly personal, mental - there was no evidence. And there was the same anxiety and uncertainty. He fell asleep.
He saw in a dream that he was lying in the same room in which he actually lay, but that he was not injured, but healthy. Many different persons, insignificant, indifferent, appear before Prince Andrei. He talks to them, argues about something unnecessary. They are going to go somewhere. Prince Andrei vaguely recalls that all this is insignificant and that he has other, most important concerns, but continues to speak, surprising them, with some empty, witty words. Little by little, imperceptibly, all these faces begin to disappear, and everything is replaced by one question about the closed door. He gets up and goes to the door to slide the bolt and lock it. Everything depends on whether or not he has time to lock it up. He walks, in a hurry, his legs do not move, and he knows that he will not have time to lock the door, but all the same, he painfully strains all his strength. And a tormenting fear seizes him. And this fear is the fear of death: it stands behind the door. But at the same time as he helplessly awkwardly crawls to the door, this is something terrible, on the other hand, already, pressing, breaking into it. Something not human - death - is breaking at the door, and we must keep it. He grabs the door, exerting his last efforts - it is no longer possible to lock it - at least to keep it; but his strength is weak, clumsy, and, pressed by the terrible, the door opens and closes again.
Once again, it pressed from there. The last, supernatural efforts are in vain, and both halves opened silently. It has entered, and it is death. And Prince Andrew died.
But at the same moment he died, Prince Andrei remembered that he was sleeping, and at the same moment he died, he, having made an effort on himself, woke up.
“Yes, it was death. I died - I woke up. Yes, death is an awakening! - suddenly brightened in his soul, and the veil that had hidden the unknown until now was lifted before his spiritual gaze. He felt, as it were, the release of the previously bound strength in him and that strange lightness that had not left him since then.
When he woke up in a cold sweat, stirred on the sofa, Natasha went up to him and asked what was wrong with him. He did not answer her and, not understanding her, looked at her with a strange look.
This was what happened to him two days before Princess Mary's arrival. From that very day, as the doctor said, the debilitating fever took on a bad character, but Natasha was not interested in what the doctor said: she saw these terrible, more undoubted, moral signs for her.
From that day on, for Prince Andrei, along with the awakening from sleep, the awakening from life began. And in relation to the duration of life, it did not seem to him more slowly than awakening from sleep in relation to the duration of a dream.

There was nothing terrible and sharp in this relatively slow awakening.
His last days and hours passed in an ordinary and simple way. And Princess Marya and Natasha, who did not leave him, felt it. They did not cry, did not shudder, and lately, feeling it themselves, they no longer followed him (he was no longer there, he left them), but for the closest memory of him - for his body. The feelings of both were so strong that they were not affected by the outer, terrible side of death, and they did not find it necessary to exasperate their grief. They did not cry either with him or without him, but they never talked about him among themselves. They felt that they could not put into words what they understood.
They both saw him sinking deeper and deeper, slowly and calmly, away from them somewhere, and both knew that this was how it should be and that it was good.
He was confessed, communed; everyone came to say goodbye to him. When they brought him his son, he put his lips to him and turned away, not because he was hard or sorry (Princess Marya and Natasha understood this), but only because he believed that this was all that was required of him; but when they told him to bless him, he did what was required and looked around, as if asking if there was anything else to be done.
When the last shudders of the body left by the spirit took place, Princess Marya and Natasha were there.
- Is it over?! - said Princess Marya, after his body had been motionless for several minutes, growing cold, lying in front of them. Natasha came up, looked into the dead eyes and hurried to close them. She closed them and did not kiss them, but kissed what was the closest memory of him.
“Where did he go? Where is he now?..”

When the dressed, washed body lay in a coffin on the table, everyone came up to him to say goodbye, and everyone wept.
Nikolushka wept from the pained bewilderment that tore at his heart. The Countess and Sonya wept with pity for Natasha and that he was no more. The old count wept that soon, he felt, he was about to take the same terrible step.
Natasha and Princess Mary were weeping now too, but they were not weeping from their own personal grief; they wept from the reverent tenderness that seized their souls before the consciousness of the simple and solemn mystery of death that took place before them.

The totality of the causes of phenomena is inaccessible to the human mind. But the need to find causes is embedded in the human soul. And the human mind, not delving into the innumerability and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, each of which separately can be represented as a cause, grabs at the first, most understandable approximation and says: here is the cause. In historical events (where the subject of observation is the actions of people), the most primitive rapprochement is the will of the gods, then the will of those people who stand in the most prominent historical place - historical heroes. But one has only to delve into the essence of each historical event, that is, into the activity of the entire mass of people who participated in the event, in order to be convinced that the will of the historical hero not only does not direct the actions of the masses, but is itself constantly guided. It would seem that it is all the same to understand the meaning of a historical event one way or another. But between the man who says that the peoples of the West went to the East because Napoleon wanted it, and the man who says that it happened because it had to happen, there is the same difference that existed between people who said that the land stands firmly and the planets move around it, and those who said that they did not know what the earth was based on, but they knew that there were laws governing the movement of both her and other planets. There are no and cannot be causes of a historical event, except for the single cause of all causes. But there are laws that govern events, partly unknown, partly groping for us. The discovery of these laws is possible only when we completely renounce the search for causes in the will of one person, just as the discovery of the laws of the motion of the planets became possible only when people renounced the representation of the affirmation of the earth.

After the battle of Borodino, the occupation of Moscow by the enemy and burning it, historians recognize the movement of the Russian army from the Ryazan to the Kaluga road and to the Tarutino camp - the so-called flank march behind Krasnaya Pakhra as the most important episode of the war of 1812. Historians attribute the glory of this brilliant feat to various persons and argue about who, in fact, it belongs to. Even foreign, even French, historians recognize the genius of the Russian generals when they speak of this flank march. But why military writers, and after them all, believe that this flank march is a very thoughtful invention of some one person that saved Russia and ruined Napoleon is very difficult to understand. In the first place, it is difficult to understand what is the profoundness and genius of this movement; for in order to guess that the best position of the army (when it is not attacked) is where there is more food, no great mental effort is needed. And everyone, even a stupid thirteen-year-old boy, could easily guess that in 1812 the most advantageous position of the army, after retreating from Moscow, was on the Kaluga road. So, it is impossible to understand, firstly, by what conclusions historians reach the point of seeing something profound in this maneuver. Secondly, it is even more difficult to understand in what exactly historians see this maneuver as saving for the Russians and harmful for the French; for this flank march, under other, preceding, accompanying and subsequent circumstances, could be detrimental to the Russian and saving for the French army. If from the time this movement was made, the position of the Russian army began to improve, then it does not follow from this that this movement was the cause.
This flank march not only could not bring any benefits, but could ruin the Russian army, if other conditions did not coincide. What would have happened if Moscow had not burned down? If Murat had not lost sight of the Russians? If Napoleon had not been inactive? What if, on the advice of Bennigsen and Barclay, the Russian army had fought near Krasnaya Pakhra? What would happen if the French attacked the Russians when they were following Pakhra? What would have happened if later Napoleon, approaching Tarutin, attacked the Russians with at least one tenth of the energy with which he attacked in Smolensk? What would happen if the French went to St. Petersburg?.. With all these assumptions, the salvation of the flank march could turn into pernicious.
Thirdly, and most incomprehensibly, is that people who study history deliberately do not want to see that the flank march cannot be attributed to any one person, that no one ever foresaw it, that this maneuver, just like the retreat in Filiakh, in the present, was never presented to anyone in its integrity, but step by step, event after event, moment by moment, it followed from an innumerable number of the most diverse conditions, and only then presented itself in all its integrity when it was completed and became past.
At the council at Fili, the dominant thought of the Russian authorities was the self-evident retreat in a direct direction back, that is, along the Nizhny Novgorod road. Evidence of this is the fact that the majority of votes at the council were cast in this sense, and, most importantly, the well-known conversation after the council of the commander-in-chief with Lansky, who was in charge of the provisions department. Lanskoy reported to the commander-in-chief that food for the army was collected mainly along the Oka, in the Tula and Kaluga provinces, and that in the event of a retreat to Nizhny, the provisions would be separated from the army by the large river Oka, through which transportation in the first winter is impossible. This was the first sign of the need to deviate from the direct direction to the Lower, which had previously seemed the most natural. The army kept to the south, along the Ryazan road, and closer to the reserves. Subsequently, the inaction of the French, who even lost sight of the Russian army, concerns about the protection of the Tula plant and, most importantly, the benefits of approaching their reserves, forced the army to deviate even further south, to the Tula road. Having crossed in a desperate movement beyond Pakhra to the Tula road, the commanders of the Russian army thought to remain at Podolsk, and there was no thought of the Tarutino position; but countless circumstances and the reappearance of French troops, who had previously lost sight of the Russians, and the plans for the battle, and, most importantly, the abundance of provisions in Kaluga, forced our army to deviate even more to the south and move into the middle of their food routes, from the Tulskaya to the Kaluga road, to Tarutino. Just as it is impossible to answer the question when Moscow was abandoned, it is also impossible to answer when exactly and by whom it was decided to go over to Tarutin. Only when the troops had already arrived at Tarutino as a result of innumerable differential forces, only then did people begin to assure themselves that they wanted this and had long foreseen it.

The famous flank march consisted only in the fact that the Russian army, retreating straight back in the opposite direction of the offensive, after the French offensive had stopped, deviated from the direct direction taken at first and, not seeing persecution behind them, naturally leaned in the direction where it attracted an abundance of food.
If we imagined not brilliant commanders at the head of the Russian army, but simply one army without commanders, then this army could not do anything other than move back to Moscow, describing an arc from the side from which there was more food and the land was more abundant.
This movement from the Nizhny Novgorod to the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads was so natural that the marauders of the Russian army ran off in this very direction and that in this very direction it was required from Petersburg that Kutuzov transfer his army. In Tarutino, Kutuzov almost received a reprimand from the sovereign for having withdrawn the army to the Ryazan road, and he was pointed out the very position against Kaluga in which he was already at the time he received the sovereign's letter.
Rolling back in the direction of the push given to it during the entire campaign and in the Battle of Borodino, the ball of the Russian army, with the destruction of the force of the push and not receiving new shocks, took the position that was natural to it.
Kutuzov's merit did not lie in some kind of ingenious, as they call it, strategic maneuver, but in the fact that he alone understood the significance of the event taking place. He alone understood even then the significance of the inaction of the French army, he alone continued to assert that the battle of Borodino was a victory; he alone - the one who, it would seem, by his position as commander-in-chief, should have been called to the offensive - he alone used all his strength to keep the Russian army from useless battles.
The slain beast near Borodino lay somewhere where the runaway hunter had left it; but whether he was alive, whether he was strong, or whether he was only hiding, the hunter did not know this. Suddenly, the groan of this beast was heard.
The groan of this wounded beast, the French army, denouncing her death, was the sending of Loriston to Kutuzov's camp with a request for peace.
Napoleon, with his confidence that it was not good that was good, but that it was good that came to his mind, wrote Kutuzov the words that first came to his mind and did not make any sense. He wrote:

“Monsieur le prince Koutouzov,” he wrote, “j" envoie pres de vous un de mes aides de camps generaux pour vous entretenir de plusieurs objets interessants. Je desire que Votre Altesse ajoute foi a ce qu "il lui dira, surtout lorsqu" il exprimera les sentiments d "estime et de particuliere consideration que j" ai depuis longtemps pour sa personne… Cette lettre n "etant a autre fin, je prie Dieu, Monsieur le prince Koutouzov, qu" il vous ait en sa sainte et digne garde ,
Moscou, le 3 Octobre, 1812. Signe:
Napoleon.
[Prince Kutuzov, I am sending you one of my adjutant generals to negotiate with you on many important subjects. I ask Your Grace to believe everything he tells you, especially when he begins to express to you the feelings of respect and special respect that I have had for you for a long time. I pray to God to keep you under my sacred roof.
Moscow, October 3, 1812.
Napoleon. ]

"Je serais maudit par la posterite si l" on me regardait comme le premier moteur d "un accommodement quelconque. Tel est l "esprit actuel de ma nation", [I would be damned if they looked at me as the first instigator of any deal; this is the will of our people.] - answered Kutuzov and continued to use all his strength for that to keep troops from advancing.
In the month of the robbery of the French army in Moscow and the calm stationing of the Russian army near Tarutino, a change took place in relation to the strength of both troops (spirit and number), as a result of which the advantage of strength turned out to be on the side of the Russians. Despite the fact that the position of the French army and its numbers were unknown to the Russians, as soon as attitudes changed, the need for an offensive was immediately expressed in countless signs. These signs were: the sending of Loriston, and the abundance of provisions in Tarutino, and the information that came from all sides about the inaction and disorder of the French, and the recruitment of our regiments, and good weather, and the long rest of Russian soldiers, and usually arising in the troops as a result of rest impatience to do the work for which everyone is gathered, and curiosity about what was being done in the French army, so long lost sight of, and the courage with which Russian outposts were now snooping around the French stationed in Tarutino, and news of easy victories over the French peasants and the partisans, and the envy aroused by this, and the feeling of revenge that lay in the soul of every person as long as the French were in Moscow, and the (most important) vague, but arising in the soul of every soldier, the consciousness that the ratio of strength has now changed and the advantage is on our side. The essential balance of forces changed and an offensive became necessary. And immediately, just as surely as the chimes begin to strike and play in a clock, when the hand has made a full circle, in the higher spheres, in accordance with a significant change in forces, an increased movement, hissing and playing of the chimes was reflected.

The Russian army was controlled by Kutuzov with his headquarters and the sovereign from St. Petersburg. In St. Petersburg, even before the news of the abandonment of Moscow was received, a detailed plan for the entire war was drawn up and sent to Kutuzov for guidance. Despite the fact that this plan was drawn up on the assumption that Moscow was still in our hands, this plan was approved by the headquarters and accepted for execution. Kutuzov wrote only that long-range sabotage is always difficult to carry out. And to resolve the difficulties encountered, new instructions and persons were sent who were supposed to monitor his actions and report on them.
In addition, now the entire headquarters has been transformed in the Russian army. The places of the murdered Bagration and the offended, retired Barclay were replaced. They considered very seriously what would be better: to put A. in the place of B., and B. in the place of D., or, on the contrary, D. in the place of A., etc., as if something other than the pleasure of A. and B., could depend on it.
At the army headquarters, on the occasion of Kutuzov's hostility with his chief of staff, Benigsen, and the presence of the sovereign's confidants and these movements, there was a more than usual complex game of parties: A. undermined B., D. under S., etc. ., in all possible displacements and combinations. With all these underminings, the subject of intrigues was for the most part the military business that all these people thought to direct; but this warfare proceeded independently of them, exactly as it was supposed to proceed, that is, never coinciding with what people thought up, but proceeding from the essence of mass relations. All these inventions, intercrossing, entangled, represented in the higher spheres only a true reflection of what was to be accomplished.

Choice of battle site. The patrols reported to Prince Alexander that an insignificant detachment of the enemy moved towards Izborsk, and most of the troops turned towards Lake Pskov. Having received this news, Alexander turned his troops east to the shores of Lake Peipsi. The choice was dictated by strategic and tactical calculations. At this position, Alexander Nevsky with his regiments cut off all possible approaches to Novgorod to the enemy, thus finding himself in the very center of all possible enemy routes. Probably, the Russian military leader knew how 8 years ago, on the ice-bound waters of the Embakh River, his father, Prince Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, defeated the knights, knew about the advantages of fighting heavily armed knights in winter conditions.

Alexander Nevsky decided to give battle to the enemy on Lake Peipsi, north of the Uzmen tract, near the island of Voronii Kamen. Several important sources have come down to us about the famous "Battle on the Ice". From the Russian side, these are the Novgorod Chronicles and the Life of Alexander Nevsky, from Western sources - the Rhymed Chronicle (the author is unknown).

Number question. One of the most difficult and controversial issues is the size of the enemy armies. The chroniclers of both sides did not give exact data. Some historians believed that the number of German troops was 10-12 thousand people, and Novgorodians - 12-15 thousand people. It is likely that few knights took part in the battle on the ice, and most of the German army was made up of militias from among the Estonians and Livs.

Preparation of the parties for the battle. On the morning of April 5, 1242, the crusader knights lined up in battle formation, ironically referred to by Russian chroniclers as the "great pig" or wedge. The tip of the "wedge" was directed at the Russians. On the flanks of the battle structure stood knights clad in heavy armor, and lightly armed warriors were located inside.

There is no detailed information about the combat disposition of the Russian rati in the sources. Probably, it was a "regimental rank" common for the military practice of the Russian princes of that time, with a sentry regiment in front. The battle formations of the Russian troops were facing the steep bank, and behind one of the flanks in the forest was the squad of Alexander Nevsky. The Germans were forced to advance on open ice, not knowing the exact location and number of Russian troops.

The course of the battle. Despite the sparing coverage of the course of the famous battle in the sources, the course of the battle is schematically clear. Putting out long spears, the knights attacked the "brow", i.e. center of Russian rati. Showered with a hail of arrows, the "wedge" crashed into the location of the guard regiment. The author of the "Rhyming Chronicle" wrote: "Here the banners of the brothers penetrated the ranks of the shooters, it was heard how the swords were ringing, and it was seen how the helmets were cut, the dead fell on both sides." A Russian chronicler also wrote about the breakthrough of the guard regiment by the Germans: "The Germans also made their way like a pig through the regiments."

This first success of the crusaders was, apparently, foreseen by the Russian commander, as well as the difficulties encountered after that, insurmountable for the enemy. Here is how one of the best domestic military historians wrote about this stage of the battle: “... Having stumbled upon the steep shore of the lake, the inactive, armored knights could not develop their success. who had nowhere to turn to fight."

The Russian troops did not allow the Germans to develop their success on the flanks, and the German wedge was firmly clamped in pincers, losing the harmony of the ranks and freedom of maneuver, which turned out to be disastrous for the crusaders. At the most unexpected moment for the enemy, Alexander ordered the ambush regiment to attack and surround the Germans. "And that battle of evil was great and great for the Germans and people," the chronicler reported.

Armed with special hooks, Russian militias and combatants pulled the knights from their horses, after which the heavily armed "God's nobles" became completely helpless. Under the weight of the crowded knights, the melted ice began to crack and crack in some places. Only part of the crusader army managed to break out of the encirclement, trying to escape. Some of the knights drowned. At the end of the "Battle on the Ice", the Russian regiments pursued the adversary retreating on the ice of Lake Peipus "seven miles to the Sokolitsky coast." The defeat of the Germans culminated in an agreement between the order and Novgorod, according to which the crusaders left all the captured Russian lands and returned the prisoners; for their part, the Pskovites also released captured Germans.

The meaning of the battle, its unique result. The defeat of the Swedish and German knights is a bright page in the military history of Russia. In the Battle of the Neva and the Battle of the Ice, the Russian troops under the command of Alexander Yaroslavich Nevsky, performing an essentially defensive task, were distinguished by decisive and consistent offensive actions. Each subsequent campaign of the regiments of Alexander Nevsky had its own tactical task, but the commander himself did not lose sight of the general strategy. So, in the battles of 1241-1242. the Russian military leader delivered a number of successive blows to the enemy before the decisive battle took place.

Novgorod troops in all battles with the Swedes and Germans perfectly used the element of surprise. An unexpected attack destroyed the Swedish knights who had landed at the mouth of the Neva, the Germans were driven out of Pskov with a swift and unexpected blow, and then from Koporye, and finally, the attack of the ambush regiment in the Battle of the Ice was quick and sudden, which led to a complete confusion of the enemy’s battle ranks. The battle formations and tactics of the Russian troops turned out to be more flexible than the notorious wedge formation of the order's troops. Alexander Nevsky, using the terrain, managed to deprive the enemy of space and freedom of maneuver, surround and destroy.

The unusualness of the battle on Lake Peipsi also lies in the fact that for the first time in the military practice of the Middle Ages, heavy cavalry was defeated by foot troops. According to the fair remark of the historian of military art, "the tactical encirclement of the German knightly troops by the Russian army, i.e. the use of one of their complex and decisive forms of military art, is the only case of the entire feudal period of the war. Only the Russian army under the command of a talented commander could carry out a tactical encirclement strong, well-armed enemy."

The victory over the German knights was extremely important in military and political terms. The onslaught of the Germans on Eastern Europe was delayed for a long time. Novgorod the Great retained the ability to maintain economic and cultural ties with European countries, defended the possibility of access to the Baltic Sea, and defended Russian lands in the Northwestern region. The defeat of the crusaders pushed other peoples to resist crusader aggression. Here is how the famous historian of Ancient Rus' M.N. Tikhomirov: "In the history of the fight against the German conquerors, the Battle of the Ice is the greatest date. This battle can only be compared with the Grunwald defeat of the Teutonic Knights in 1410. The fight against the Germans continued further, but the Germans could never cause any significant harm to the Russian lands , and Pskov remained a formidable stronghold against which all subsequent German attacks crashed. Despite the fact that we see the author's well-known exaggeration of the significance of the victory on Lake Peipus, we can agree with him.

Another important consequence of the Battle on the Ice should be assessed within the framework of the general situation of Rus' in the 40s. 13th century In the event of the defeat of Novgorod, a real threat would be created of the seizure of the northwestern Russian lands by the troops of the order, and given that Rus' had already been conquered by the Tatars, it would probably be twice as difficult to get rid of the double oppression of the Russian people.

With all the severity of the Tatar oppression, there was one circumstance that ultimately turned out in favor of Rus'. Mongol-Tatars who conquered Rus' in the 13th century. remained pagans, respectful and wary of someone else's faith and did not encroach on it. The Teutonic army, supervised personally by the Pope, tried by all means to introduce Catholicism in the conquered territories. The destruction or at least the undermining of the Orthodox faith for the scattered Russian lands, which had lost their unity, would mean the loss of cultural identity and the loss of any hope of restoring political independence. It was Orthodoxy in the era of Tatarism and political fragmentation, when the population of numerous lands and principalities of Rus' almost lost a sense of unity, was the basis for the revival of national identity.

Read also other topics part IX "Rus' between East and West: battles of the XIII and XV centuries." section "Rus and Slavic countries in the Middle Ages":

• 39. "Who are the Essence and the Departure": the Tatar-Mongols at the beginning of the 13th century.
• 41. Genghis Khan and the "Muslim front": campaigns, sieges, conquests
• 42. Rus' and Polovtsians on the eve of Kalka
  • Polovtsy. Military-political organization and social structure of the Polovtsian hordes
  • Prince Mstislav Udaloy. Princely Congress in Kyiv - decision to help the Polovtsy
• 44. Crusaders in the Eastern Baltic